

RG 263 CIA

RAOUL WALLENBERG FILE

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Chief, European Division

FROM: William M. Henhoeffter
Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection

SUBJECT: Raoul Wallenberg and his U.S. Intelligence Connections

DECLASSIFIED
NND 947008
By *[Signature]*
NARS, Date 12/10/93

1. (U) This is intended to inform you of recent press allegations in the Western and Soviet press that Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat in Budapest in 1944-45 who saved tens of thousands of Jews from the Holocaust and then disappeared after being imprisoned by the Soviets, had connections with Western intelligence.
2. (S/NF) The allegations are essentially correct and what follows is drawn from CIA files. The money Wallenberg spent to save Jews came through Iver Olsen, an American official stationed in Stockholm. Olsen was an officer of CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services. However, he claimed to CIA interviewers in 1955 that he simultaneously worked for Treasury and the War Refugee Board. He insisted to these interviewers that Wallenberg dealt with him only in his War Refugee Board capacity and not in any intelligence activities. The text of this 1955 interview, and the summary of it sent by CIA to State the same year, were released to the public in 1982 under the Freedom of Information Act. In 1979 the State Department told the Soviets that Wallenberg's humanitarian activities were funded by the U.S., but did not tell them about the fact that Wallenberg's contact - Olsen - worked for OSS.
3. (U) Thus, there are some loose ends to this story. In the coming months or years, there may be some criticism of CIA because the OSS connection, though indirect, undoubtedly

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from the wallenbergs

SUBJECT:

Raoul Wallenberg and his U.S. Intelligence
Connection

provided a pretext for the Soviet imprisonment of this heroic international figure. On the other hand, it should be deeply satisfying to every American intelligence officer that not only American funds but, at least indirectly, American intelligence expertise helped to save some Jews from the Holocaust.

William M. Henhoeffler
William M. Henhoeffler

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9 January 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, European Division,
Directorate of Operations

FROM: William M. Henhoeffter
Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection

SUBJECT: Raoul Wallenberg and His Reported US
Intelligence Connections

REFERENCE: Our Telecon of 27 December 1989

1. This memorandum summarizes what CIA knows about Raoul Wallenberg's indirect connections with the Office of Strategic Services, what recent publications say on the subject, and what current issues might be involved. Pertinent documents are attached. (S/NF)

2. In releasing materials on Wallenberg to the public, CIA has at least until recently deleted the fact that his contact in Stockholm was an OSS employee, Iver Olsen. Consider the text of [REDACTED]'s article on Wallenberg published in Studies in Intelligence. The full text remains SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM. I have underlined the passages in text that were deleted. A copy of the sanitized version is also attached; the recipient has no doubt that deletions were made. (S/NF)

3. On the other hand I have learned since I spoke to you on 27 December that CIA has released three documents dated 1955 confirming Iver Olsen's status as paymaster of Wallenberg, and Olsen's OSS connections. Strange as it may seem to our generation of intelligence officers, the documents affirm Olsen's belief that he was working simultaneously for three US government agencies - OSS, Treasury, and the War Refugee Board - while posted to Stockholm and in contact with Wallenberg, and that his contacts with Wallenberg had nothing to do with intelligence activities but were conducted under the auspices of the War Refugee Board. Both the Studies article and the 1955 documents were released in 1982. (U)

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SUBJECT: Raoul Wallenberg and His Reported US Intelligence Connections

4. Tom Bower's new book clearly uses this 1955 information, and adds significant details about Olsen's OSS activities - specifically, his dispatch of Lithuanians into territory then occupied by the Germans but claimed by our allies the Soviets. The source notes in the book indicate that this additional information came from the Iver Olsen papers in the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park. CIA has only indirect influence over the use of these papers, and there may have been an inadvertent disclosure of classified information. In any case, like the 1955 documents this information is now out there for public scrutiny. (U)

5. A recent press conference reported by The Times of London carries the claim by two Dutch authors that Wallenberg "may have been a spy" for OSS. Clearly the authors have had access to the 1955 documents, but they chose not to cite Olsen's strong denial that Wallenberg was engaged in intelligence activities. (U)

6. Two recent Soviet press accounts indicate:

- Soviet media skepticism, reflected in New Times, that Wallenberg was a spy;
- a new lead, published in Moscow News, indicating that Wallenberg, under the name "Pattersson" or "Pettersson", was alive for at least four years beyond the date the Soviets officially claim as the year of his death. (U)

7. There are probably two options the US Government might consider at this time:

- Say nothing; if pressed we can always claim we have released already what we essentially know; to say more now might embarrass Wallenberg supporters and the Wallenberg family by suggesting, despite what Olsen said in 1955, that Wallenberg performed some intelligence-related assignments.
- Initiate a private official conversation with the Soviets; tell them we understand they have been doing their best to solve the Wallenberg mystery,

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but we want them to be certain of what we know about Wallenberg's connections with Iver Olsen so that they can pursue the "Pattersson" ("Pettersson") lead. We would be updating a 1979 State "non-paper" in which the USG stated to the Soviets that Wallenberg's money was American, but omitted mention of Olsen and OSS. We would also be preempting criticism from US journalists - or Congressmen - that we were not doing our best to solve the mystery but were still trying to hide something. (S/NF)

8. Colleagues with whom I discussed this matter expressed doubts that anything worthwhile would be gained for the USG by pursuing the second option. As a historian I can see several gains, not the least of which would be finding out how the Soviets came to be suspicious of Wallenberg. As an intelligence officer, I share most of my colleagues' doubts. On the other hand I believe the Soviets might be more inclined to cooperate with the USG on other matters if they perceived we had shown glasnost on the Wallenberg case. (S/NF)

(s)

William M. Henhoeffter

Attachments:

- A. Studies article on Wallenberg, 1981 (S/NF)
- B. Sanitized Studies article
- C. Three sanitized 1955 documents
- D. Excerpts from Tom Bower, The Red Web (1989)
- E. Times article on Wallenberg, 7 November 1989
- F. New Times article on Wallenberg, May-June 1989
- G. Moscow News article on "Pattersson", October 22-29, 1989

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(SUMMER 1981)

His role in US rescue efforts may have doomed the missing diplomat

WALLENBERG: A LINGERING TRAGEDY OF WORLD WAR II



January 1981 marked the 36th anniversary of the disappearance of Raoul Gustaf Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat credited with saving thousands of Hungarian Jews during World War II. Arrested by the Soviets in 1945, Wallenberg's fate remains a tantalizing mystery fed by continuing reports that he survives somewhere in the Soviet gulag. Pressure from successive Swedish governments as well as recent queries from the United States and Israel have failed to extract a satisfactory explanation from Moscow. Neither Stalin, Khrushchev, or the current Soviet leadership have provided answers to why Wallenberg was arrested and detained, or what fate befell him. Although the definitive story may never be told, a look into the declassified documents of the US War Refugee Board, which actually sponsored Wallenberg's project, provides some interesting insights into the clandestine character of that organization—a factor that could have aroused Soviet suspicions and led to his disappearance.

In 1979, the US State Department accepted partial responsibility for Wallenberg's fate by admitting in a so-called "non paper" presented to the Soviet chargé in Washington that the US had provided funds for the program to save Hungarian Jews. The Department failed to reveal, however, that Wallenberg's contact man at the US legation in Stockholm, Iver C. Olsen, was a member of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the parent organization of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Hungarian project was one of about a half-dozen similar operations sponsored by the War Refugee Board—not the OSS—in an effort to save European Jewry from the Nazi holocaust. At great personal risk, Wallenberg extended neutralist Sweden's diplomatic protection to Hungarian Jews, often using false documents and bribery, and sometimes resorting to bold deceptions. He is credited with having saved at least 20,000 lives. Mentioned for the Nobel peace prize for the first time in 1948, his name has been put forward almost every year since.

Wallenberg was born to the recently widowed Baroness Maj von Dardel of Stockholm on August 4, 1912. His father was Jewish and was related to the wealthy Swedish banking family headed by Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg. Earlier generations of the Wallenberg family had enjoyed distinguished careers in the diplomatic service. One of Raoul's grand uncles had served as Swedish Minister to the Legation in the United States and another was Foreign Minister during World War I. His aunt was married to Colonel William Calvin of Connecticut, a former US military attache in Stockholm.

Wallenberg was an architect by profession and had studied at the University of Michigan in 1934 and 1935. US diplomatic correspondence following his disappearance indicates that he was well connected in Washington and may have been

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personally acquainted with President Roosevelt. He had been working with a firm in Stockholm in June 1944 when the Swedish Foreign Office approached him to take an assignment at the Swedish Legation in Budapest. Accepting the assignment, Wallenberg told the American Minister in Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, that he wanted to save lives and was not interested merely in filing reports to the Foreign Office. Both Johnson and Iver Olsen, who was also the War Refugee Board representative in Stockholm, were impressed with Wallenberg and described him as "our choice" for the job.

Johnson informed the Department in a cable on June 29, 1944 that the Swedish Foreign Office felt that by assigning Wallenberg to Budapest it was cooperating fully with the furtherance of an "American program." According to Johnson, Wallenberg felt that he was carrying out a mission for the US War Refugee Board—implying that he viewed his posting as an attache to the Swedish Legation as his cover. Consequently, the newly appointed attache requested that Washington cable full instructions outlining his duties, limits of authority and extent of financial support. Johnson recommended that Wallenberg not be restricted by a "concrete program," but be given rather general instructions that would allow him to deal with situations as they developed. He further informed Washington that arrangements had been made to communicate with Wallenberg in Budapest through the Foreign Office in Stockholm.

Wallenberg's instructions were passed in a War Refugee Board cable relayed in July by the State Department to Stockholm. They included an account of how much funding was available, a description of the various refugee escape channels that might be used to smuggle out Hungarian Jews and a list of possible friendly contacts in the Budapest area. Olsen was told to pass on to Wallenberg as much of this information as he deemed advisable. The Board's message also said that:

"while he (Wallenberg) cannot of course, act as the Board's representative, nor purport to act in its name, he can, whenever advisable, indicate that as a Swede he is free to communicate with Stockholm where a representative of the Board is stationed. He may thus express his willingness to lay before the Board's representative specific proposals if in any particular case he should deem so doing to be advisable, or if by reason of the nature of the proposals Olsen's or the Board's approval is necessary."

In order to appreciate Wallenberg's accomplishments it is necessary to understand the plight of European Jewry in the spring of 1944. The German army had suffered devastating losses in the East and the long anticipated Allied invasion of Europe seemed imminent. Despite accounts of the horrors of Nazi extermination camps, most Jews, particularly those in Hungary who had survived in one of Europe's most anti-semitic countries, were reluctant to believe the thoroughness of Hitler's "final solution." Many Jews fled from Germany, Slovakia, and Poland to Hungary despite its history of anti-semitism and its reputation as a loyal ally of Nazi Germany. Anti-semitism long had been an element of life in Hungary. In 1924, long before Hitler came to power, Hungary promulgated the first discriminatory laws against Jews.

Nevertheless, as the war drew to a close, the Jewish population in Hungary increased as a result of the influx of refugees. For their part, many Hungarian Jews thought Germany soon would pull back its forces and negotiate a surrender. The Horthy government certainly would have followed Berlin's lead. Instead, Horthy was deposed and on March 19, 1944 elements of the German army entered Budapest and the one-time ally for all practical purposes, became an occupied country under the

Szalasi regime. A few days later, Adolf Eichmann, architect of the final solution, arrived in Budapest along with some of the most infamous officers of the Sonder Einsatzkommandos—the special section of the Gestapo charged with the extinction of Jews. Germany was going to lose the war but efforts to complete the extermination of the Jews was accorded top priority.

In spite of these developments, most Jews refused to take any defensive action. Efforts to form a resistance, spearheaded by young Hungarian Zionists, were only partially successful because the majority of Jews would not take up arms. The docility of the Hungarian Jews, choosing to believe that the Germans eventually would abandon their extermination plans, was turned to Nazi advantage by Eichmann. When Jews by the thousands were turned out of their homes and herded into ghettos and staging areas for transport to the death camps, Jewish leaders often went among their co-religionists urging them not to panic and to cooperate with Nazi and Hungarian authorities. As a result, during the spring and summer of 1944, some 800,000 Jews were transported from Hungary and executed.

Earlier that year, stories of the holocaust had begun to reach Washington, Stockholm and other world capitals. While few grasped the extent of the horror, President Roosevelt put into action plans to assist the remaining Jews to escape and to discourage further atrocities, particularly in countries allied to Germany. Roosevelt issued a statement warning the Hungarians and other German allies that the US was determined to see that those who shared the guilt of Nazi policies be punished. Similar resolutions were passed by both the House and Senate. Copies of both were given to Wallenberg with the instruction that whenever possible he should call them to the attention of the Hungarian authorities.

The War Refugee Board was established in January 1944 as part of the Executive Office of the President. The Board was composed of the Secretaries of State, Treasury and War. The Board's mission was to combat the Nazi efforts to exterminate captive people because of their race, religion, or political beliefs. The first Executive Director of the Board was John Pehle, assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury. He was succeeded a year later by Brigadier General William O'Dwyer who directed the Board until its dissolution in September 1945.

The records of the Board suggest that the experience gained by the Administration in setting up the Office of Strategic Services a few years earlier was used to establish the new organization. Special representatives served the Board in strategic areas in or near the European mainland—Turkey, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, the UK, Italy, and North Africa. Their communications were classified and the Board's representatives and contacts in enemy territory—sometimes referred to as "agents"—often had cover. Although those of the Board's records dealing with Wallenberg fail to reveal any connection with any intelligence organization, a still classified list of OSS employees identifies Iver C. Olsen, the Board's representative in Stockholm and the link between Wallenberg and Washington, as a member of the Special Intelligence Branch, OSS. Olsen was a diplomat and Board representative; [REDACTED] in the fall of 1944, as well. If Olsen's identity was known to Soviet intelligence—[REDACTED]—it is possible that Wallenberg's contacts with American intelligence may have aroused Soviet suspicion.

Wallenberg arrived in Budapest in July and immediately rented a 16-room office which he placed under the extraterritoriality of the Swedish Legation. This office had a

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great deal more space than he needed for clerical functions, of course, and soon provided sanctuary for several prominent religious leaders. His advent had coincided with a temporary suspension in the transport of Jews to the camps. In two months prior to his arrival, however, Hungarian police had turned over 400,000 to the SS. With the temporary suspension order, local Hungarian authorities agreed to proposals by the War Refugee Board, the Swedish Red Cross and the Jewish Agency of Palestine that some Jews be allowed to emigrate and others be extended the protection of neutral legations in Budapest. Wallenberg seized on this and began acquiring properties throughout the city which he placed under the Swedish banner as sanctuaries for thousands of Jews.

A dispatch from Iver Olsen in Stockholm in August reflected the zeal with which Wallenberg approached his task. Olsen wrote John Pehle, Executive Director of the Board:

"I get the impression that the Swedish Foreign Office is somewhat uneasy about Wallenberg's activities in Budapest, and perhaps feel that he has jumped in with too big a splash. They would prefer, of course, to approach the Jewish problem in the finest traditions of European diplomacy, which wouldn't help too much."

In the same dispatch he relates how Wallenberg "left in a hell of a hurry with no instructions and no funds." The Board had ample funds but getting the monies to Wallenberg may have caused some problems as he frantically acquired properties and bribed local officials. Dealing with Hungarian authorities Wallenberg at first experienced considerable success; for example, the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm informed the Swedish Foreign Office in August that the Hungarian government agreed to authorize the emigration to Sweden of Jews recently granted citizenship by the Swedish king. Other Jews could emigrate, as well, provided they had relatives or long standing business connections in Sweden. Wallenberg screened thousands of Jews who might fit the criteria for emigration under the Hungarian edict and found some 5,000 of 9,000 eligible. He issued the necessary documentation for those who qualified and tried to protect the rest from being conscripted into labor battalions or transported to Germany by placing them in houses under the Swedish flag.

By the end of September, an additional 5,000 persons had been extended Swedish protection. According to a cable from Minister Johnson in Stockholm, deportations from Hungary to the death camps had officially stopped and Jews in Budapest appeared to be "reasonably safe for the time being." Wallenberg was less optimistic, as the German occupiers began extending their authority and Hungarian officials caved in. In some of the more remote concentration camps in Hungary, for example, German forces continued to commandeer Jewish prisoners for deportation.

When the deportations "officially" resumed, Wallenberg doubled his efforts to establish more "Swedish houses" and even sequestered some in private homes throughout Budapest. These Jews would otherwise have been deported or swept into labor battalions by the Nazis or their local adherents, the Hungarian Arrow Cross. According to some accounts, Wallenberg cooperated with the Swiss Legation and Hazalah, a small Jewish resistance group, in duplicating protection certificates and establishing sanctuaries. Several times, he reportedly faced down Nazi and Hungarian authorities trying to deport Jews under his governments's protection. According to a Stockholm press account forwarded to Washington by Minister Johnson, Wallenberg confronted armed Hungarian troops who had entered one of his houses in search of

labor conscripts and warned "none leaves this place as long as I live." Thus balked the troops withdrew; later their commander returned to talk with Wallenberg. After an hour, according to the story, Wallenberg received a written pledge from the commander saying that Jews under Swedish protection were exempt from labor service.

One of the most famous episodes involves Wallenberg racing a deportation train that was headed for the death camps in Germany. Apparently the Gestapo had herded several people with Swedish protection on a train already crowded with other Jews. Informed of this, Wallenberg raced to the Budapest railway station only to discover that the train had departed. He pursued it by car to a small town near the Hungarian border, confronted the train commander and demanded the release of the documented captives. The commander relented and Wallenberg returned to Budapest with "his" people—the rest of the passengers were not so fortunate.

The effectiveness of the Hungarian government waned in the months before the Soviet occupation in January 1945. No one was safe. Jews and other unfortunate minorities fell easy prey to the Gestapo, the Arrow Cross and other thugs. Wallenberg was harassed and it was rumored that the Arrow Cross had put a price on his head. His car was stolen and once his office staff was arrested. The confusion, however, probably contributed to the success of some of his efforts. Bogus documentation replete with forged stamps and seals was effective in persuading military authorities and police to release prisoners. Many Hungarian Jews owe their lives to the documents skillfully crafted by Wallenberg and others.

By December, the relief effort guided by Wallenberg had reached considerable proportions, with 335 employees in addition to about 40 physicians, house governors, and miscellaneous helpers. He had rented at least ten houses—one account claims 30—to shelter Jews and had two hospitals with a total of 150 beds, along with several soup kitchens and a ration card system for distributing food. Wallenberg had convinced the Hungarian authorities that Jews with foreign documentation already serving in labor battalions in Hungary should be returned to Budapest. Some 15,000 were. Through the intervention of Wallenberg and his staff over 2,000 others were snatched from deportation points at the last minute. According to a report from the Swedish Foreign Office, Jews bearing Swedish protective passports fared better than the other wards of foreign missions in Hungary.

Nevertheless, the situation in Budapest became even more dangerous as the Nazis and their Arrow Cross sympathizers made a last ditch attempt to annihilate those Jews still alive. Wallenberg devoted all his energies to caring for those under his protection and reportedly cooperated with nascent Jewish resistance groups. According to the account of a Polish officer who spent 15 years in Soviet prisons and who knew Wallenberg, the Swede spent the early weeks in January 1945 rounding up weapons for the small band of Jewish resistance fighters in Budapest. Some of these Hazalahs donned Gestapo garb and actually guarded properties used for quartering Jews.

By mid-January the first contingents of the Soviet army reached the environs of Budapest. One historian of this period claims that when a Soviet patrol visited the Swedish Legation on January 13 Wallenberg asked to be put in touch with the local Soviet commander. Four days later, according to a press account, Wallenberg, escorted by Soviet military personnel, appeared at the Jewish "relief office" in Budapest. He said he was on his way to see Marshal Rodion Malinovsky. "I'm going," he said but "I don't know if its as their guest or their prisoner."

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Another version of Wallenberg's disappearance is attributed to a Latvian named Krisko who worked as a Russian interpreter at the Swedish Legation in Budapest at the time. The Legation had employed Krisko to handle Russian traffic after Sweden accepted responsibility for Soviet interests when Hungary declared war on the USSR. Krisko and Wallenberg were arrested about the same time and held at a Soviet military facility outside Budapest. On January 20 they were flown to Moscow. This was the first time they had seen each other since before their arrest and, according to Krisko, Wallenberg, who was sitting under guard several feet away, nodded in recognition. Wallenberg, "looked buoyant, probably thinking his arrest was a misunderstanding." A few days later the Swedish Legation in Moscow was informed by the Soviets that Wallenberg was under their "protection."

As the plight of Jewish refugees improved following the Nazi collapse in Hungary, communications between Stockholm and the War Refugee Board diminished; it was April before Minister Johnson reported to Washington that Sweden had asked for US assistance in determining Wallenberg's fate. He said there had been unconfirmed radio reports that Wallenberg had been murdered, presumably by the Arrow Cross, and asked that our Embassy in Moscow be instructed to request assistance from the Soviet government. In reaction to Johnson's cable, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau reminded Secretary of State Edward Stettinius of his own personal interest in Wallenberg in a handwritten note on April 4. Correspondence concerning Wallenberg tapered off over the summer and the War Refugee Board was dissolved in September.

Swedes loyal to Wallenberg, however, were loath to let the issue rest. A Wallenberg Committee was formed to pressure the Stockholm government to continue to query the Soviets. In the early post-war years, less than enthusiastic socialist governments in Stockholm tried to avoid provoking the Soviets. Nevertheless, after several attempts to elicit a response from Moscow, a functionary at the Soviet Legation in Stockholm said in 1946 that Wallenberg was "being taken care of for some foolish things he had done." Another story claimed that Wallenberg had been convicted by a Soviet court as an American spy and sentenced to 25 years.

There are a number of things that may have caused the Soviets to doubt Wallenberg's credentials. His modus operandi certainly exceeded standard diplomatic practice. The falsification of documents for Jewish refugees, the use of bribes, and his successful use of bluff and bravado on numerous occasions were probably known to them. His familiarity with the Soviet interests section of the Swedish Legation, implied by the interpreter Krisko who also was accused by the Soviets of being an American spy, may have increased those suspicions. The generally muddled condition of Wallenberg's bona fides is reflected in a portion of a digest cable from Allied headquarters in Caserta, Italy in May 1945. According to a source in Budapest (possibly Brigadier General Bonner Key, OSS):

"General Key has asked the Soviet military authorities for information regarding the whereabouts of Wallenberg, Meier, and Feller. The instruction in the Department's 12 for Budapest will be complied with as far as possible, but the fact that the Soviet authorities may well have conclusive proof of pro-Nazi collaboration on the part of Feller and possibly of Meier and Wallenberg should be of interest to the Department."

The reference to collaboration with the Nazi's probably referred to Wallenberg's use of bribes to gain the release of Jews and other refugees.

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Some of the communications passed by the War Refugee Board representative in Stockholm through the Swedish Foreign Office to Wallenberg also may have aroused suspicion. For example, shortly after Wallenberg arrived in Hungary, the Department of State asked Olsen in Stockholm to request him to forward to a Hungarian businessman a message from his partner in Los Angeles. The communication was cryptic with numerous references to the reputed partner's personal effects—ruby cuff links, his wife's gold bracelet, a brooch with green stone, etc. The businessman was to be told that he could expect to go to Switzerland soon and should "apply for a visa immediately." The Department's explanation for the message was that the two men were business associates and that the partner in Budapest soon was to go to Switzerland on banking business. The cable cautioned Olsen, however, that if he thought it was inappropriate for any reason to pass the message he was to advise the Board, which would reconsider the action. Although there is no indication that the message was passed to Wallenberg or by him to anyone else, such instructions, if compromised, could have raised questions about his assignment.

Efforts to get the Soviets to provide an explanation of what happened to Wallenberg span the 36 years since his disappearance. Stalin reportedly took a personal interest in investigating Wallenberg's case but failed to reveal his fate. When Khrushchev visited Stockholm in 1956 he was presented a petition by Wallenberg's mother and the Soviet leader promised to "clear up the matter." Subsequently, Moscow officially announced that a "man named Raoul Wallenberg died of a heart attack in July 1947" in Lubyanka prison. The Swedes requested the remains of the body—only to be told it had been cremated—despite the usual Soviet practice of burying deceased prisoners with their number plate affixed to a leg. In the Brezhnev era, Soviet officials seem torn between the Lubyanka story and another that asserts that Wallenberg was killed by Nazis or Hungarian fascists before the fall of Budapest in revenge for saving Jews.

A number of reports from prisoners released by the Soviets over the years since the 1950s trace Wallenberg's odyssey through the Soviet prison system. Former inmates of Lubyanka, Vladimir, Aleksandrov Central, Verkhneuralsk, and other prisons have reported meeting Wallenberg or of knowing some other prisoner who knew him. One of the most recent and credible accounts is that of Jan Kaplan, a former inmate of Butryka prison, who wrote his daughter in Israel that while in the prison infirmary in 1977 he had met a Swede who had been in several different prisons over the past 30 years. According to Kaplan, the Swede "was in pretty good condition." This report was subsequently relayed to Stockholm and the Swedish government sent yet another note to the Soviets in January 1979. The response: "No Further Information."

Nevertheless, the Israeli government felt that Kaplan's tale merited further investigation and Prime Minister Begin urged President Carter to ask Brezhnev about Wallenberg when the two leaders met at the Summit in Vienna in 1979. Members of the US delegation queried their Soviet counterparts to no avail. An earlier attempt to bring highlevel US pressure to bear on the Soviets may have occurred in 1973. According to Nina Lagergren, Wallenberg's half-sister who visited Washington in the summer of 1979, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger vetoed instructions from his staff to the US Ambassador in Moscow to demand information regarding Wallenberg. If so, Kissinger probably sensed that such a demand would have been detrimental to the spirit of detente. Lagergren's visit, however, coincided with the "non-paper" mentioned earlier which admitted partial US funding for Wallenberg's project.

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In January 1980—the 35th anniversary of Wallenberg's disappearance—a group representing Wallenberg demonstrated outside the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm. The Swedish Foreign Ministry issued a statement reviewing Wallenberg's role as a humanitarian and informed the Soviets that Sweden's demand for a complete disclosure concerning his fate remained unsatisfied. The government also released previously classified information detailing immediate postwar attempts to gain Wallenberg's freedom. The documents confirmed the unwillingness of Sweden's post war governments to antagonize Moscow over Wallenberg. According to press reports, one document indicated that Stockholm had turned down an offer by former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson to intercede with the Soviets to gain Wallenberg's release.

On the 36th anniversary of Wallenberg's disappearance in January 1981, some 350 persons attended a "hearing" in Stockholm sponsored by the Swedish Wallenberg Association. Marcus Wallenberg, the patriarch of the Swedish banking dynasty, the British and Israeli ambassadors, and the wife of US Senator Daniel Moynihan, attended. Several former Soviet prisoners testified to direct or indirect contact with a Swedish prisoner long after 1947, when the Soviets claim Wallenberg died. Gideon Hausner, chairman of the Israeli Wallenberg Committee and the prosecutor of Adolph Eichmann, told the audience that he had seen no convincing evidence that Wallenberg had died. On the contrary, Hausner felt that there was "considerable material" to contradict the Soviet version of Wallenberg's fate. Hausner also reminded demonstrators that Wallenberg had been appointed to his task by President Roosevelt and declared "we don't want to relieve America of the responsibility to pursue the case." Hausner's comments were echoed by Simon Wiesenthal, founder of the Jewish Documentation Center in Vienna.

In all probability, such activities merely will annoy the Soviets, producing few results. It would seem unlikely that the present regime in Moscow would call attention to the fact that Wallenberg's life, or 36 years of it, had been forfeited to their whim. What could they say? That his arrest was simply a misunderstanding carried out by overzealous security personnel operating under a blanket order to arrest all suspicious foreigners in Budapest? Then what about his early years of detention? Thousands of German prisoners of war were detained in the Soviet Union for years after the war. Had Wallenberg been returned before 1950, for example, his detention might have been attributed to administrative error.

A possible opportunity to get a definitive answer to the Wallenberg affair may occur when a change in leadership takes place in the Soviet Union . . . a time when criticism of the previous regime is sometimes permitted. Until then, the true fate of Raoul Wallenberg may never be clear, but his humanitarian accomplishments are irrefutable.

(B)

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Studies in Intelligence

Summer 1981



His role in US rescue efforts may
have doomed the missing diplomat

Raoul

WALLENBERG: A LINGERING TRAGEDY OF WORLD WAR II



January 1981 marked the 36th anniversary of the disappearance of Raoul Gustaf Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat credited with saving thousands of Hungarian Jews during World War II. Arrested by the Soviets in 1945, Wallenberg's fate remains a tantalizing mystery fed by continuing reports that he survives somewhere in the Soviet gulag. Pressure from successive Swedish governments as well as recent queries from the United States and Israel have failed to extract a satisfactory explanation from Moscow. Neither Stalin, Khrushchev, or the current Soviet leadership have provided answers to why Wallenberg was arrested and detained, or what fate befell him. Although the definitive story may never be told, a look into the declassified documents of the US War Refugee Board, which actually sponsored Wallenberg's project, provides some interesting insights into the clandestine character of that organization—a factor that could have aroused Soviet suspicions and led to his disappearance.

In 1979, the US State Department accepted partial responsibility for Wallenberg's fate by admitting in a so-called "non paper" presented to the Soviet chargé in Washington that the US had provided funds for the program to save Hungarian Jews.

The Hungarian project was one of about a half-dozen similar operations sponsored by the War Refugee Board—not the OSS—in an effort to save European Jewry from the Nazi holocaust. At great personal risk, Wallenberg extended neutralist Sweden's diplomatic protection to Hungarian Jews, often using false documents and bribery, and sometimes resorting to bold deceptions. He is credited with having saved at least 20,000 lives. Mentioned for the Nobel peace prize for the first time in 1948, his name has been put forward almost every year since.

Wallenberg was born to the recently widowed Baroness Maj von Dardel of Stockholm on August 4, 1912. His father was Jewish and was related to the wealthy Swedish banking family headed by Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg. Earlier generations of the Wallenberg family had enjoyed distinguished careers in the diplomatic service. One of Raoul's grand uncles had served as Swedish Minister to the Legation in the United States and another was Foreign Minister during World War I. His aunt was married to Colonel William Calvin of Connecticut, a former US military attache in Stockholm.

Wallenberg was an architect by profession and had studied at the University of Michigan in 1934 and 1935. US diplomatic correspondence following his disappearance indicates that he was well-connected in Washington and may have been

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personally acquainted with President Roosevelt. He had been working with a firm in Stockholm in June 1944 when the Swedish Foreign Office approached him to take an assignment at the Swedish Legation in Budapest. Accepting the assignment, Wallenberg told the American Minister in Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, that he wanted to save lives and was not interested merely in filing reports to the Foreign Office. Both Johnson and

were impressed with Wallenberg and described him as "our choice" for the job.

Johnson informed the Department in a cable on June 29, 1944 that the Swedish Foreign Office felt that by assigning Wallenberg to Budapest it was cooperating fully with the furtherance of an "American program." According to Johnson, Wallenberg felt that he was carrying out a mission for the US War Refugee Board—implying that he viewed his posting as an attache to the Swedish Legation as his cover. Consequently, the newly appointed attache requested that Washington cable full instructions outlining his duties, limits of authority and extent of financial support. Johnson recommended that Wallenberg not be restricted by a "concrete program," but be given rather general instructions that would allow him to deal with situations as they developed. He further informed Washington that arrangements had been made to communicate with Wallenberg in Budapest through the Foreign Office in Stockholm.

Wallenberg's instructions were passed in a War Refugee Board cable relayed in July by the State Department to Stockholm. They included an account of how much funding was available, a description of the various refugee escape channels that might be used to smuggle out Hungarian Jews and a list of possible friendly contacts in the Budapest area.

The Board's message also said that:

"while he (Wallenberg) cannot of course, act as the Board's representative, nor purport to act in its name, he can, whenever advisable, indicate that as a Swede he is free to communicate with Stockholm where a representative of the Board is stationed. He may thus express his willingness to lay before the Board's representative specific proposals if in any particular case he should deem so doing to be advisable, or if by reason of the nature of the proposals Olsen's or the Board's approval is necessary."

In order to appreciate Wallenberg's accomplishments it is necessary to understand the plight of European Jewry in the spring of 1944. The German army had suffered devastating losses in the East and the long anticipated Allied invasion of Europe seemed imminent. Despite accounts of the horrors of Nazi extermination camps, most Jews, particularly those in Hungary who had survived in one of Europe's most anti-semitic countries, were reluctant to believe the thoroughness of Hitler's "final solution." Many Jews fled from Germany, Slovakia, and Poland to Hungary despite its history of anti-semitism and its reputation as a loyal ally of Nazi Germany. Anti-semitism long had been an element of life in Hungary. In 1924, long before Hitler came to power, Hungary promulgated the first discriminatory laws against Jews.

Nevertheless, as the war drew to a close, the Jewish population in Hungary increased as a result of the influx of refugees. For their part, many Hungarian Jews thought Germany soon would pull back its forces and negotiate a surrender. The Horthy government certainly would have followed Berlin's lead. Instead, Horthy was deposed and on March 19, 1944 elements of the German army entered Budapest and the one-time ally for all practical purposes, became an occupied country under the

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Szalasi regime. A few days later, Adolf Eichmann, architect of the final solution, arrived in Budapest along with some of the most infamous officers of the Sonderaktion, the special section of the Gestapo charged with the extermination of Jews. Germany was going to lose the war but efforts to complete the extermination of the Jews was accorded top priority.

In spite of these developments, most Jews refused to take any defensive action. Efforts to form a resistance, spearheaded by young Hungarian Zionists, were only partially successful because the majority of Jews would not take up arms. The destiny of the Hungarian Jews, choosing to believe that the Germans eventually would abandon their extermination plans, was turned to Nazi advantage by Eichmann. When Jews by the thousands were turned out of their homes and herded into ghettos and staging areas for transport to the death camps, Jewish leaders often went among their co-religionists urging them not to panic and to cooperate with Nazi and Hungarian authorities. As a result, during the spring and summer of 1944, some 800,000 Jews were transported from Hungary and executed.

Earlier that year, stories of the holocaust had begun to reach Washington, Stockholm and other world capitals. While few grasped the extent of the horror, President Roosevelt put into action plans to assist the remaining Jews to escape and to discourage further atrocities, particularly in countries allied to Germany. Roosevelt issued a statement warning the Hungarians and other German allies that the US was determined to see that those who shared the guilt of Nazi policies be punished. Similar resolutions were passed by both the House and Senate. Copies of both were given to Wallenberg with the instruction that whenever possible he should call them to the attention of the Hungarian authorities.

The War Refugee Board was established in January 1944 as part of the Executive Office of the President. The Board was composed of the Secretaries of State, Treasury and War. The Board's mission was to combat the Nazi efforts to exterminate captive people because of their race, religion, or political beliefs. The first Executive Director of the Board was John Pehle, assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury. He was succeeded a year later by Brigadier General William O'Dwyer who directed the Board until its dissolution in September 1945.

The records of the Board suggest that the experience gained by the Administration in setting up the Office of Strategic Services a few years earlier was used to establish the new organization. Special representatives served the Board in strategic areas in or near the European mainland—Turkey, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, the UK, Italy, and North Africa. Their communications were classified and the Board's representatives and contacts in enemy territory—sometimes referred to as "agents"—often had cover.

Wallenberg arrived in Budapest in July and immediately rented a 16-room office which he placed under the extraterritoriality of the Swedish Legation. This office had a

great deal more space than he needed for clerical functions, of course, and soon provided sanctuary for several prominent religious leaders. His advent had coincided with a temporary suspension in the transport of Jews to the camps. In two months prior to his arrival, however, Hungarian police had turned over 400,000 to the SS. With the temporary suspension order, local Hungarian authorities agreed to proposals by the War Refugee Board, the Swedish Red Cross and the Jewish Agency of Palestine that some Jews be allowed to emigrate and others be extended the protection of neutral legations in Budapest. Wallenberg seized on this and begun acquiring properties throughout the city which he placed under the Swedish banner as sanctuaries for thousands of Jews.

A dispatch from Iver Olsen in Stockholm in August reflected the zeal with which Wallenberg approached his task. Olsen wrote John Pehle, Executive Director of the Board:

"I get the impression that the Swedish Foreign Office is somewhat uneasy about Wallenberg's activities in Budapest, and perhaps feel that he has jumped in with too big a splash. They would prefer, of course, to approach the Jewish problem in the finest traditions of European diplomacy, which wouldn't help too much."

In the same dispatch he relates how Wallenberg "left in a hell of a hurry with no instructions and no funds." The Board had ample funds but getting the monies to Wallenberg may have caused some problems as he frantically acquired properties and bribed local officials. Dealing with Hungarian authorities Wallenberg at first experienced considerable success; for example, the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm informed the Swedish Foreign Office in August that the Hungarian government agreed to authorize the emigration to Sweden of Jews recently granted citizenship by the Swedish king. Other Jews could emigrate, as well, provided they had relatives or long standing business connections in Sweden. Wallenberg screened thousands of Jews who might fit the criteria for emigration under the Hungarian edict and found some 5,000 of 9,000 eligible. He issued the necessary documentation for those who qualified and tried to protect the rest from being conscripted into labor battalions or transported to Germany by placing them in houses under the Swedish flag.

By the end of September, an additional 5,000 persons had been extended Swedish protection. According to a cable from Minister Johnson in Stockholm, deportations from Hungary to the death camps had officially stopped and Jews in Budapest appeared to be "reasonably safe for the time being." Wallenberg was less optimistic, as the German occupiers began extending their authority and Hungarian officials caved in. In some of the more remote concentration camps in Hungary, for example, German forces continued to commandeer Jewish prisoners for deportation.

When the deportations "officially" resumed, Wallenberg doubled his efforts to establish more "Swedish houses" and even sequestered some in private homes throughout Budapest. These Jews would otherwise have been deported or swept into labor battalions by the Nazis or their local adherents, the Hungarian Arrow Cross. According to some accounts, Wallenberg cooperated with the Swiss Legation and Hazzalah, a small Jewish resistance group, in duplicating protection certificates and establishing sanctuaries. Several times, he reportedly faced down Nazi and Hungarian authorities trying to deport Jews under his government's protection. According to a Stockholm press account forwarded to Washington by Minister Johnson, Wallenberg confronted armed Hungarian troops who had entered one of his houses in search of

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labor conscripts and warned "none leaves this place as long as I live." Thus balked the troops withdrew; later their commander returned to talk with Wallenberg. After an hour, according to the story, Wallenberg received a written pledge from the commander saying that Jews under Swedish protection were exempt from labor service.

One of the most famous episodes involves Wallenberg racing a deportation train that was headed for the death camps in Germany. Apparently the Gestapo had herded several people on a train already crowded with other Jews. Informed of this, Wallenberg raced to the Budapest railway station only to discover that the train had departed. He pursued it by car to a small town near the Hungarian border, confronted the train commander and demanded the release of the documented captives. The commander relented and Wallenberg returned to Budapest with "his" people—the rest of the passengers were not so fortunate.

The effectiveness of the Hungarian government waned in the months before the Soviet occupation in January 1945. No one was safe. Jews and other unfortunate minorities fell easy prey to the Gestapo, the Arrow Cross and other thugs. Wallenberg was harassed and it was rumored that the Arrow Cross had put a price on his head. His car was stolen and once his office staff was arrested. The confusion, however, probably contributed to the success of some of his efforts. Bogus documentation replete with forged stamps and seals was effective in persuading military authorities and police to release prisoners. Many Hungarian Jews owe their lives to the documents skillfully crafted by Wallenberg and others.

By December, the relief effort guided by Wallenberg had reached considerable proportions, with 335 employees in addition to about 40 physicians, house governors, and miscellaneous helpers. He had rented at least ten houses—one account claims 30—to shelter Jews and had two hospitals with a total of 150 beds, along with several soup kitchens and a ration card system for distributing food. Wallenberg had convinced the Hungarian authorities that Jews with foreign documentation already serving in labor battalions in Hungary should be returned to Budapest. Some 15,000 were. Through the intervention of Wallenberg and his staff over 2,000 others were snatched from deportation points at the last minute. According to a report from the Swedish Foreign Office, Jews bearing Swedish protective passports fared better than the other wards of foreign missions in Hungary.

Nevertheless, the situation in Budapest became even more dangerous as the Nazis and their Arrow Cross sympathizers made a last ditch attempt to annihilate those Jews still alive. Wallenberg devoted all his energies to caring for those under his protection and reportedly cooperated with nascent Jewish resistance groups. According to the account of a Polish officer who spent 15 years in Soviet prisons and who knew Wallenberg, the Swede spent the early weeks in January 1945 rounding up weapons for the small band of Jewish resistance fighters in Budapest. Some of these Hazalahs donned Gestapo garb and actually guarded properties used for quartering Jews.

By mid-January the first contingents of the Soviet army reached the environs of Budapest. One historian of this period claims that when a Soviet patrol visited the Swedish Legation on January 13 Wallenberg asked to be put in touch with the local Soviet commander. Four days later, according to a press account, Wallenberg, escorted by Soviet military personnel, appeared at the Jewish "relief office" in Budapest. He said he was on his way to see Marshal Rodion Malinovsky. "I'm going," he said but "I don't know if its as their guest or their prisoner."

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Another version of Wallenberg's disappearance is attributed to a Latvian named Krisko who worked as a Russian interpreter at the Swedish Legation in Budapest at the time. The Legation had employed Krisko to handle Russian traffic after Sweden accepted responsibility for Soviet interests when Hungary declared war on the USSR. Krisko and Wallenberg were arrested about the same time and held at a Soviet military facility outside Budapest. On January 20 they were flown to Moscow. This was the first time they had seen each other since before their arrest and, according to Krisko, Wallenberg, who was sitting under guard several feet away, nodded in recognition. Wallenberg, "looked buoyant, probably thinking his arrest was a misunderstanding." A few days later the Swedish Legation in Moscow was informed by the Soviets that Wallenberg was under their "protection."

As the plight of Jewish refugees improved following the Nazi collapse in Hungary, communications between Stockholm and the War Refugee Board diminished. It was April before Minister Johnson reported to Washington that Sweden had asked for US assistance in determining Wallenberg's fate. He said there had been unconfirmed radio reports that Wallenberg had been murdered, presumably by the Arrow Cross, and asked that our Embassy in Moscow be instructed to request assistance from the Soviet government. In reaction to Johnson's cable, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau reminded Secretary of State Edward Stettinious of his own personal interest in Wallenberg in a handwritten note on April 4. Correspondence concerning Wallenberg tapered off over the summer and the War Refugee Board was dissolved in September.

Swedes loyal to Wallenberg, however, were loath to let the issue rest. A Wallenberg Committee was formed to pressure the Stockholm government to continue to query the Soviets. In the early post-war years, less than enthusiastic socialist governments in Stockholm tried to avoid provoking the Soviets. Nevertheless, after several attempts to elicit a response from Moscow, a functionary at the Soviet Legation in Stockholm said in 1946 that Wallenberg was "being taken care of for some foolish things he had done." Another story claimed that Wallenberg had been convicted by a Soviet court as an American spy and sentenced to 25 years.

There are a number of things that may have caused the Soviets to doubt Wallenberg's credentials. His modus operandi certainly exceeded standard diplomatic practice. The falsification of documents for Jewish refugees, the use of bribes, and his successful use of bluff and bravado on numerous occasions were probably known to them. His familiarity with the Soviet interests section of the Swedish Legation, implied by the interpreter Krisko who also was accused by the Soviets of being an American spy, may have increased those suspicions.

His role may have doomed him

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Some of the communications passed by the War Refugee Board representative in Stockholm through the Swedish Foreign Office to Wallenberg also may have aroused suspicion. For example, shortly after Wallenberg arrived in Hungary, the Department of State asked Olsen in Stockholm to request him to forward to a Hungarian businessman a message from his partner in Los Angeles. The communication was cryptic with numerous references to the reputed partner's personal effects—ruby cuff links, his wife's gold bracelet, a brooch with green stone, etc. The businessman was to be told that he could expect to go to Switzerland soon and should "apply for a visa immediately." The Department's explanation for the message was that the two men were business associates and that the partner in Budapest soon was to go to Switzerland on banking business. The cable cautioned Olsen, however, that if he thought it was inappropriate for any reason to pass the message he was to advise the Board, which would reconsider the action. Although there is no indication that the message was passed to Wallenberg or by him to anyone else, such instructions, if compromised, could have raised questions about his assignment.

Efforts to get the Soviets to provide an explanation of what happened to Wallenberg span the 36 years since his disappearance. Stalin reportedly took a personal interest in investigating Wallenberg's case but failed to reveal his fate. When Khrushchev visited Stockholm in 1956 he was presented a petition by Wallenberg's mother and the Soviet leader promised to "clear up the matter." Subsequently, Moscow officially announced that a "man named Raoul Wallenberg died of a heart attack in July 1947" in Lubyanka prison. The Swedes requested the remains of the body—only to be told it had been cremated—despite the usual Soviet practice of burying deceased prisoners with their number plate affixed to a leg. In the Brezhnev era, Soviet officials seem torn between the Lubyanka story and another that asserts that Wallenberg was killed by Nazis or Hungarian fascists before the fall of Budapest in revenge for saving Jews.

A number of reports from prisoners released by the Soviets over the years since the 1950s trace Wallenberg's odyssey through the Soviet prison system. Former inmates of Lubyanka, Vladimir, Aleksandrov Central, Verkhneural'sk, and other prisons have reported meeting Wallenberg or of knowing some other prisoner who knew him. One of the most recent and credible accounts is that of Jan Kaplan, a former inmate of Butryka prison, who wrote his daughter in Israel that while in the prison infirmary in 1977 he had met a Swede who had been in several different prisons over the past 30 years. According to Kaplan, the Swede "was in pretty good condition." This report was subsequently relayed to Stockholm and the Swedish government sent yet another note to the Soviets in January 1979. The response: "No Further Information."

Nevertheless, the Israeli government felt that Kaplan's tale merited further investigation and Prime Minister Begin urged President Carter to ask Brezhnev about Wallenberg when the two leaders met at the Summit in Vienna in 1979. Members of the US delegation queried their Soviet counterparts to no avail. An earlier attempt to bring highlevel US pressure to bear on the Soviets may have occurred in 1973. According to Nina Lagergren, Wallenberg's half-sister who visited Washington in the summer of 1979, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger vetoed instructions from his staff to the US Ambassador in Moscow to demand information regarding Wallenberg. If so, Kissinger probably sensed that such a demand would have been detrimental to the spirit of detente. Lagergren's visit, however, coincided with the "non-paper" mentioned earlier which admitted partial US funding for Wallenberg's project.

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Date: 8/12/72

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In January 1980—the 35th anniversary of Wallenberg's disappearance—a group representing Wallenberg demonstrated outside the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm. The Swedish Foreign Ministry issued a statement reviewing Wallenberg's role as a humanitarian and informed the Soviets that Sweden's demand for a complete disclosure concerning his fate remained unsatisfied. The government also released previously classified information detailing immediate postwar attempts to gain Wallenberg's freedom.

On the 36th anniversary of Wallenberg's disappearance in January 1981, some 350 persons attended a "hearing" in Stockholm sponsored by the Swedish Wallenberg Association. Marcus Wallenberg, the patriarch of the Swedish banking dynasty, the British and Israeli ambassadors, and the wife of US Senator Daniel Moynihan, attended. Several former Soviet prisoners testified to direct or indirect contact with a Swedish prisoner long after 1947, when the Soviets claim Wallenberg died. Gideon Hausner, chairman of the Israeli Wallenberg Committee and the prosecutor of Adolph Eichmann, told the audience that he had seen no convincing evidence that Wallenberg had died. On the contrary, Hausner felt that there was "considerable material" to contradict the Soviet version of Wallenberg's fate. Hausner also reminded demonstrators that Wallenberg had been appointed to his task by President Roosevelt and declared "we don't want to relieve America of the responsibility to pursue the case." Hausner's comments were echoed by Simon Wiesenthal, founder of the Jewish Documentation Center in Vienna.

In all probability, such activities merely will annoy the Soviets, producing few results. It would seem unlikely that the present regime in Moscow would call attention to the fact that Wallenberg's life, or 36 years of it, had been forfeited to their whim. What could they say? That his arrest was simply a misunderstanding carried out by overzealous security personnel operating under a blanket-order to arrest all suspicious foreigners in Budapest? Then what about his early years of detention? Thousands of German prisoners of war were detained in the Soviet Union for years after the war. Had Wallenberg been returned before 1950, for example, his detention might have been attributed to administrative error.

A possible opportunity to get a definitive answer to the Wallenberg affair may occur when a change in leadership takes place in the Soviet Union . . . a time when criticism of the previous regime is sometimes permitted. Until then, the true fate of Raoul Wallenberg may never be clear, but his humanitarian accomplishments are irrefutable.

SANITIZED COPY

61-355

16 November 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Mr. Iver C. Olsen, former employee of OSS in Stockholm

1. This office is attempting to determine if Raoul Wallenberg, a member of a prominent Swedish family, who disappeared under peculiar circumstances in Budapest during the fighting late in 1944 was engaged on an OSS mission in any way. The old OSS files reveal little information and three [REDACTED] employees [REDACTED] could furnish no first hand information on subject.

2. Mr. Iver C. Olsen, for years an employee of the Treasury Department and who was an employee of OSS in Stockholm during this period and [REDACTED], would have personal knowledge of any relations which OSS might have had with Wallenberg.

3. [REDACTED] who is dealing with this matter for the [REDACTED] and who is acquainted with Mr. Olsen would like to ask him if he could shed any light on the question whether Wallenberg was in any way engaged on an OSS mission at the time.

4. Will you please advise this office if there is any derogatory information in your files relating to Iver Olsen which would preclude or make inadvisable [REDACTED] making such an inquiry.

APPROVED FOR

15 MAR 1982

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WALLENBERG FILE

13 December 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
ATTN: [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: Ivar C. OLSEN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NND 947008
By: LAW NARA Date: 12/1/78

1. Reference is made to conversations between [REDACTED] and the writer on the question of querying Subject regarding his connection with Raoul WALLINBERG. Following notification by [REDACTED] that the Security Office had indicated that it had no objection to the writer's interviewing Subject, Subject was telephoned at his office and a meeting was arranged for 1 December 1955.

2. [REDACTED]

3. At the meeting with Subject on 1 December 1955, our interest in Raoul WALLINBERG was explained to Subject and he was told that we were turning to him for assistance in clearing up a question to which there appeared to be no answer in our files or that of any of our predecessor organizations. Subject indicated his understanding of our interest and his complete willingness to assist.

4. The writer sketched briefly our knowledge of Subject's connection with WALLINBERG, basing this largely on information contained in Raoul Wallenberg - Hero in Budapest, a book in Swedish by Jens Lervall, published in Stockholm in 1946. Subject confirmed the facts, as they pertain to his relationship with WALLINBERG, related in this book. [REDACTED] asked whether he had at any time had any [REDACTED] contact with WALLINBERG. Subject replied to both questions with a very firm negative. Subject went on to explain that during his assignment in Stockholm during World War II, he actually worked for three U.S. Government agencies: the Treasury Department, in which capacity he acted as Financial Attache of the American Legation in Stockholm; the War Relocation Authority, of which he was the Stockholm representative; and C.I.S.

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5. Subject's contact with WALLINBERG was only in his capacity as representative of the War Refugee Board. Subject was extremely emphatic on this point and returned to it on several occasions during the course of the meeting, apparently wishing to insure that there was no misunderstanding on this score. As had been indicated in the book cited above, Subject was instrumental in the selection of WALLINBERG for the mission to Budapest. Following WALLINBERG's assignment to the Swedish Legation in Budapest, WALLINBERG was supplied by Subject with funds solely for the purpose of assisting Jews in Hungary.

6. In explaining the mechanics of funding WALLINBERG in Budapest, Subject said that an account had been opened by the JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE (JDC) in the Stockholm Enskilda Bank, Stockholm. The funds in this account were earmarked for WALLINBERG and Subject was authorized to draw on this account. Whenever WALLINBERG indicated, through means of letters punched from Budapest to the Foreign Office in Stockholm, that he needed funds, Subject withdrew the necessary funds from the account referred to above and would send them to WALLINBERG.

Subject stated that, except for 10,000 Swedish kroner which were given to WALLINBERG from the President's secret fund (2), all funds given to WALLINBERG were from the account referred to above and all funds given to him were solely for use in connection with refugee work.

7. Following WALLINBERG's disappearance in Budapest, the balance remaining in the account at that time, which according to Subject was fairly considerable, was withdrawn from the account, the account closed and the money returned to the JDC.

Subject also said that a 3 volume TOP SECRET report on War Refugee Board activities in Sweden contained all the documentary evidence on Subject's dealings with WALLINBERG; according to Subject, this Agency and the Department of State each held a copy of this report.

8. In reply to the writer's question, Subject indicated his willingness to discuss this matter further if desired and to answer any questions which the Department of State or the Agency might wish to pose.

DISSEMINATION

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SANITIZED COPY

21 December 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. A. Sidney Buford, III
Director, Office of Libraries and
Intelligence-Acquisition

SUBJECT: Information Concerning Raoul WALLENBERG

1. Your memorandum of 3 November 1955, addressed to [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency, has been referred to this organization for reply as the Strategic Services Unit is charged with responsibility for liquidating the affairs of the Office of Strategic Services. A thorough review of our files as well as consultation with former officials of the OSS have resulted in the firm conclusion that WALLENBERG was in fact never employed by U. S. intelligence in any capacity. The following background information concerning subject was developed in the course of our research, which, however, may be of assistance to your Department.

2. During World War II WALLENBERG, while in Stockholm, was in contact with Mr. Iver C. OLSEN who was then stationed at the American Legation as Financial Attache, as a representative of the Treasury Department; secondly, as an OSS representative; and thirdly, as Stockholm representative of the War Refugee Board. It is understood that it was solely in this latter connection that WALLENBERG had dealings with OLSEN who was later instrumental in the selection of WALLENBERG for the mission to Budapest.

3. Following WALLENBERG's assignment to the Swedish Legation in Budapest he was supplied by OLSEN with funds for use only in assisting Jews in Hungary. These funds were made available to WALLENBERG through an account opened by the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) in the Stockholm Enskilda Bank, Stockholm. OLSEN drew on this account whenever WALLENBERG indicated a need for additional funds. The funds were then forwarded through Swedish Foreign Office channels. With the exception of 10,000 Swedish kronor which were given to WALLENBERG from the President's secret fund, all other funds came from the account in Stockholm and were used only in connection with refugee work.

4. Subsequent to WALLENBERG's disappearance in Budapest, the Stockholm account was closed, and the remaining balance, which is understood to have been fairly considerable, was returned to the JDC. Fuller

Approved For Release

documentary details of OLSEN's dealings with WALLINBERG are said to be found in a 3 volume TOP SECRET report on War Refugee Board Activities in Sweden, of which your Department is believed to hold a copy.

SIGNED

Executive Officer
Strategic Services Unit

(D)

The Red Web

TOM BOWER

A U R U M P R E S S

for the Liberation of Lithuania. The former diplomat explained that although VLIK was collaborating with the Germans, its leadership was committedly anti-communist and nationalist. SIS should establish contact with VLIK which could co-ordinate and lead the resistance when the Red Army arrived. Zilinskas' candidate for the mission was Algirdas Voketitis, an anti-German nationalist. McKibbin was eager to help but lacked the finance. It was therefore agreed that Zilinskas would approach representatives of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

The American Ambassador to Stockholm, Hershel Johnson, viewed intelligence activity as a 'satanic practice' and, like his British counterpart, hindered OSS officers whenever possible. Among the sufferers was Iver Olsen, officially a Financial Secretary at the Embassy, who in 1944 was also seconded as a special attaché to the War Refugee Board.

The Board was established by Roosevelt to save the victims of Nazi persecution who still survived in Europe. The Board's methods were either to exert diplomatic pressure or to take direct action. With a quarter of a million dollar budget, a large sum at the time, and with the Swedish government's agreement, Olsen hired boats to cross the Baltic to rescue the persecuted. Among his notable successes was the dispatch of Raoul Wallenberg to Hungary where the Swede saved thousands of Jews. Olsen's efforts, on his own assessment, saved 1,200 people but his attempts to use those same boats to infiltrate agents came up against the US President's strictures forbidding any activity which Stalin could construe as hostile.

In 1942, William Donovan, the founder and director of the OSS, had been told by the President that the Soviet Union should not be an intelligence target for the agency and all operations must cease. The following year, Donovan tried to reverse that ban but, although he might have received oral approval from the Joint Chiefs, the President's policy was to forge close co-operation. By December 1943 this had culminated in a high-level agreement between the OSS and the Soviet secret police, NKVD, to exchange information and representatives. An internal OSS memorandum dated 4 February 1944, entitled 'Intelligence to be Furnished to the USSR', stated that Russia 'may be given intelligence which is of distinctive OSS origin and which may be of aid to that country in prosecuting the war against Germany.' Edgar Hoover, the Director of the FBI, blocked the exchange of personnel, but Donovan obeyed the President and handed over 1,500 pages of Soviet codes which the OSS station in Stockholm had obtained from

Reino Hallamaa, exiled in Sweden, to Stalin in 1944, with which the OSS in refugees. Through way, from West to effect an improvement obtain what intelligence the Baltic refugees.

At the request Gylys, Olsen agreed German-occupied government the pro agent on the Lithuanian communicate from was landed on the boat radio operator who communication with arrested and sent to the war, there were

SIS's prospects Latvian contact was SIS source in pre-war from the Germans. ground group, the Latvian at the end of LCC's members included were both known among 30,000 Latvians had others had been confirmed that Himmler volunteers to massacre that several Latvian Europe murdering clearly not associated contacts an unblemished Latvia which was sent

The radio was under foreign minister who Sweden at the outbreak Americans a deal. In

Reino Hallamaa, the former head of Finnish intelligence who was exiled in Sweden. Another gift, which Roosevelt personally presented to Stalin in 1944, was an intelligence dossier on the resistance in Latvia which the OSS in Stockholm had compiled from interviews with refugees. Throughout 1944 the flow of intelligence was exclusively one way, from West to East; Soviet imperviousness blocked any dialogue to effect an improvement and it therefore fell to individual officers to obtain what intelligence they could. In Sweden the best sources were the Baltic refugees.

At the request of the two Lithuanian diplomats, Zilinskas and Gyls, Olsen agreed to finance the infiltration of Algirdas Voketitis into German-occupied Soviet Union. Olsen secured from the Swedish government the provision of 'technical facilities': a boat to drop the agent on the Lithuanian coast and a radio channel for him to use to communicate from Lithuania. After training, in spring 1944 Voketitis was landed on the beach near Palanga with orders to contact a trained radio operator who would put the Lithuanian partisans in direct communication with Sweden. Just one week later, Voketitis was arrested and sent to Stutthof concentration camp. For the remainder of the war, there were no further operations into Lithuania.

SIS's prospects in Latvia were more encouraging. The service's Latvian contact was Dr Valdemars Ginters who had been an important SIS source in pre-war Riga and had fled in 1943 to Sweden to escape from the Germans. Ginters claimed that a major nationalist underground group, the Latvian Central Council (LCC), had been created in Latvia at the end of 1942 and was offering its services to SIS. The LCC's members included Verners Tepfers and Bruno Kalnins who were both known anti-Nazis, an important consideration since over 30,000 Latvians had volunteered to join two Latvian SS legions and others had been conscripted to serve. Reliable informants had confirmed that Himmler's officers had tapped a willing reservoir of Latvian volunteers to massacre tens of thousands in the forests outside Riga and that several Latvian execution squads were roaming through eastern Europe murdering countless innocent civilians every day. Ginters was clearly not associated with these atrocities. He could offer his old SIS contacts an unblemished record and, more important, a radio link with Latvia which was sending reports about the German occupation.

The radio was under the care of Valdemars Salnais, a former deputy foreign minister who had first helped SIS in 1922 and had fled to Sweden at the outbreak of war. Salnais offered both the British and Americans a deal. In return for prime intelligence from inside German-

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Maclean and Philby linked



Raoul Wallenberg: Query over links to spy network.

Information passed to the Soviet Union by the British spies Donald Maclean and Kim Philby led to the arrest by the Russians of Raoul Wallenberg, Sweden's "lost hero of the Holocaust", a new book alleges.

The book, published in Stockholm yesterday, examines the role of Wallenberg's uncles, the bankers, Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg, in trading with Nazi Germany throughout the Second World War. It claims that the United States used information on these dealings to blackmail the Wallenberg brothers into co-operation in its post-war embargo policy towards the

Soviet bloc. The book, *Affarer till Varje Pris* (Business at All Costs), says that information on the Wallenberg brothers' co-operation with the US, passed to Moscow by Maclean and Philby, could have led to the Red Army's arrest of Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest in 1945, and his transportation to Moscow where the Russians claim he died in prison two years later.

"Maclean had such an important standing that they must have been fully informed of the negotiations with the Wallenberg brothers and the eventual agreement reached, an agreement that when the Cold War was at its height was

to Soviet arrest of Wallenberg

From Christopher Mosey, Stockholm

clearly directed against Moscow's interests," says the book. "It would not be surprising if both the brothers realized there was the possibility of such a Soviet revenge. They both kept quiet about Raoul Wallenberg and it was only in 1981 that Marcus ... made an official statement about him. Why did the brothers keep quiet for so long?"

Both Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg are dead and the family's affairs are run today by Marcus Wallenberg's son, Peter. He was unavailable for comment last night.

The book claims that while Raoul Wallenberg worked in

Budapest to save the lives of an estimated 100,000 Jews, his two uncles bought gold and securities stolen from Dutch Jews by the Nazi occupation forces. The co-authors, Gerard Aalders and Cees Wiebes, are Dutch and researched the book for 10 years in the archives of seven countries, including Britain.

Aalders said at a press conference to launch the book's Swedish publication last night: "The whole Raoul Wallenberg affair is based on speculation. We have merely added another possibility." He and Wiebes also claim that Raoul Wallenberg may have been a spy for the Office of

Strategic Service, the forerunner of the CIA.


"The Swede was paid for his work by the American War Refugee Board. His contact man in this organization was Ivar Olsen, trade attaché at the United States' legation in Stockholm, who also worked for the OSS."

The main subject of the book is the economic collaboration and assistance by large Swedish banks and corporations to Nazi Germany, many of them controlled by the Wallenberg family, one of the wealthiest and hitherto most respected in Sweden. The Wallenbergs control the largest bank in

Scandinavia, and many leading companies, including one which supplied the Germans with ball-bearings for the duration of the War.

Affarer till Varje Pris claims a relationship existed between the bank, the Wallenberg brothers, and IG Farben, a German company which produced poison gas used in Nazi death camps.

Mr Peder Bonde, a nephew of the brothers, said on Swedish radio the family had no reason to be ashamed of Wallenberg wartime business affairs. "They did business with businessmen who wanted to protect their own property. They were not Nazis."



Legends and the truth about Raoul Wallenberg

The name of this man has been figuring in the world press for over forty years now. Early this year the Swedish media commented again on his activities during World War II and on the seemingly mysterious circumstances under which he had died. The occasion was an American lawyer's visit to the Soviet Union and his application to the U.S.S.R. Procurator's Office for more evidence on the so-called "Raoul Wallenberg affair." Somewhat earlier, the well-known Swedish journalist Stig Fredriksson addressing a get-together of Soviet and Swedish public figures, covered by Soviet television, said it was about time the matter was settled and done with once and for all.

The fate of the Swedish diplomat remains an object of guesswork and speculations in the West. The most "popular" legend is that he is still alive, kept behind bars in the Soviet Union and, as a monograph puts it, "continues his endless travels around the GULAG." Some Swedish journalists claim he is now held in a Blagoveshchensk mental hospital. A Swedish author asserts in his book,

published in 1986, that Wallenberg is very ill. According to him, Wallenberg is confined to a madhouse, has lost all sense of reality and cannot even identify himself. His condition is being aggravated by daily contacts with mental cases. The book was translated into English and published in the U.S. in 1988.

British documentary film-makers went all out to substantiate these assertions. The "witnesses" appearing in it claim that while imprisoned in the Soviet Union they allegedly saw anonymous person who might well have been none other than Raoul Wallenberg.

Owing to the absence of glasnost in the U.S.S.R. until recently, the "Wallenberg affair" kept taking on ever newer "details" reiterated, and further added to, by newspaper after newspaper and book after book. The few and brief reports on the subject, occasionally carried by Soviet papers, only went to pour oil on the flames. They could well create the impression that the Soviet side was holding something back about Raoul Wallenberg.

The family

Well, who is Raoul Wallenberg, and why such an unabating interest is being evinced in him? What actually happened to him, and how did he find himself in the Soviet Union?

Now that many "blank spots" in history connected with the Stalin personality cult are being brought to light, and the good names of the victims of unjustified repressions restored, it would be appropriate to dwell, even though briefly, on the Swedish diplomat's tragic fate.

Raoul Wallenberg was born in 1912 into one of Sweden's wealthiest and best-known families tracing their genealogy back to the second half of the 18th century. In 1856 a Wallenberg – André Oscar – founded the Enskilda Banken with a capital of one million riksdalers to start with. The present generation of the Wallenberg banking dynasty adheres to the motto: "Exist, but invisibly." In 1971 Enskilda Banken merged with Skandinaviska Banken to form the powerful financial group Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, one

of Sweden's and Western Europe's biggest. Today the Wallenberg clan is in control of more than a hundred companies in the key branches of the Swedish national economy. These companies' products include telephones (Ericsson), ball-bearings (SKF), the Scania-Vabis trucks, the Volvo cars, the Bofors cannon and armoured cars, the Götaverken shipyards. The annual profit of the Wallenberg-controlled enterprises equals two thirds of the country's state budget.

Raoul Wallenberg's mother had married to the General Director of the Karolinska Hospital, and his sister – to the Riksmarskalk of the royal court.

A mission to Budapest

Raoul often made business trips abroad as a representative of his family bank. His business missions took him to Hungary, among other countries, which he first visited in 1938. In Budapest, the young member of a well-known and rich family was received at the Foreign Ministry, met with its top officials and with Miklos Horthy himself. The Hungarian dictator had the guest put up in one of the city's best residences – the Buda Palace.

In 1941, Raoul Wallenberg arrived in Budapest again as a private individual, and met with his high-society and business acquaintances there. Friends helped him to find his way into private mental clinics which sheltered Jews from persecutions raging through Hungary where racist laws had been adopted. It was supposedly on his second visit to Hungary that Wallenberg started his hard but noble mission of saving the victims of fascist genocide.

In July 1944 Wallenberg revisited Budapest, this time as first secretary of the Swedish diplomatic mission. The situation in Hungary had changed strikingly since his previous time there. Fierce fighting was already under way on the country's territory. Dictator Horthy, one of Nazi Germany's last satellites, had decided to turn Hungary into a bastion of the Third Reich. Oil – the value of which for the Wehrmacht increased after the loss of Romania – was pumped out of its entrails. Grain and other farm products were also shipped to Germany. German generals and Horthy were determined to offer stubborn resistance to Soviet troops.

Hungary's Jewish population suffered terribly from fascist dictatorship and terror. Notable, the Jewish community of Hungary had been one of Europe's largest before the war. At the London Times' estimate, no less than 600,000 Hungarian Jews out of nearly 900,000 were annihilated. Raoul Wallenberg established business contacts with the Foreign Ministry. He attended official receptions, masses and ball parties.

Raoul Wallenberg remained cheerful and optimistic even in the most awkward situations. One day Raoul and Tivi Zichy, a young and wealthy aristocrat, a professional racing motorist, went to the English Park. They saw a rare sideshow there. A beautiful woman sat in a rocking chair at the edge of a huge bathtub filled with the then fashionable Palmolive detergent, next to a shooting range. Whenever someone hit a target she would fall into the water with a splash. Wallenberg and Zichy offered the sideshow owner a double day's take in exchange for the beauty, and the deal was clinched to the satisfaction of all those concerned...

At that time Raoul Wallenberg had an affair with Katalin Karaty, a pretty young actress, who was courted by General Ujhazy. Having caught Raoul and Katalin together one day, the general lost his temper and was about to challenge Wallenberg to a mortal duel. With his characteristic sense of humour and presence of mind, Raoul Wallenberg assured the frenzied general that he had never met a more courageous and self-controlled man, and so noble and well-mannered one, too. Raoul admitted that the general had outbraved him. Ujhazy was flattered, grabbed Katalin by the arm and strutted away, proud as a peacock. Looking after him, Wallenberg said he would never stake his lofty mission on a silly duel.

End and means

Raoul Wallenberg collected all the evidence he could about the Hungarian Jews persecuted by the Nazis and needing immediate help. He issued to such persons documents saying that their bearers were under the protection of Swedish Authorities. Those certificates served as charters of immunity in the inferno the fascists had turned Hungary into. With the help of his trusted assistants, Wallenberg or-

ganized the evacuation from the country of all those whom he had supplied with Swedish passports. The rescued left for Switzerland by rail. The estimated number of those saved by Wallenberg varies from 4,000 to 100,000. The Soviet press put the figure at over 20,000.

The consensus of Western opinion is that the Swedish diplomat would not have succeeded in his salvation efforts hadn't he bribed Hungarian and German authorities. He was personally acquainted with top-ranking Hungarian security officers and with Adolf Eichmann, the chief of Budapest Gestapo.

Wallenberg and Eichmann, a humanist and an executioner... To look at them, one would think they were inseparable friends. They frequented the officer's casino together, moved in military and youth circles, could often be seen enjoying themselves at noisy parties. Eichmann would often cast envious glances at Wallenberg's sturdy canvas-top convertible. Having noted Eichmann's interest, Raoul, a motoring and racing enthusiast himself, once asked him, as if in jest: "Like it? I might as well get you one. Ten even. But mind you, one good turn deserves another..."

Eichmann wondered what "good turn" Wallenberg expected him to do. It turned out that the "turn" (releasing those doomed to death) called for a certain degree of resourcefulness. Eichmann had more than enough of that. And Wallenberg was generous.

Drawing upon trustworthy documents, some Western authors came to the conclusion that while in Budapest in 1944 Wallenberg was not altogether unconnected with the American intelligence service. The operations involved in saving Hungarian Jews were paid for by the U.S., the American Jewish community for the most part. This circumstance could not but furnish grounds for further speculations. One American historian wrote, for instance: Wallenberg's American connections might have given Soviet authorities the suspicion that he had been sent to Budapest on an intelligence mission. They probably knew that Ivar Olsen, a WRC (War Refugee Council – V.P.) agent in Sweden, was an OSS man, from which it followed that Wallenberg was also connected with the OSS (Office of Strategic Services – V.P.), the predecessor of the CIA. The Ameri-

can historian produces no evidence support his opinion which, therefore, remains hypothetical.

The last witnesses

At the end of December 1944, the troops of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian fronts completed the encirclement of the 190,000-strong German-Hungarian grouping near Esztergom. It took two months of fierce fighting - January and February of 1945 - to suppress the grouping. On February 13, Soviet troops took Budapest by storm.

According to a Hungarian paper, Raoul Wallenberg told one of his close associates then that he was waiting for further developments with a great deal of interest, although he wasn't sure what he was in for.

Information on the time, place and circumstances of Wallenberg's arrest is extremely controversial. In his U.S.-published book, Jeno Leval writes that Wallenberg was last seen in Benczur Street, Pest, on January 17, 1945, escorted by Soviet officers, and that he was to be sent to Debrecen, the seat of the Provisional National Government of Hungary headed by Colonel General Bela Miklos. The idea probably was to hand Wallenberg over to Hungarian authorities as a person who had maintained close links

with Hungarian fascists and German Nazis (the true nature of those relationships was, naturally, not known at that time). The diplomat himself might have wished to enter into contact with the new regime as an official representative of Sweden.

Early in 1987, the Hungarian paper Magyar Hirlap carried an interview with Laszlo Hertelendy, an assistant of Wallenberg's. Hertelendy said he had seen Raoul Wallenberg last on February 12, 1945, in the church on Krisztina Square in Budapest. According to him, that day could not be mixed up with any other, because it was then that Soviet patrolmen and Hungarian volunteers wearing red armbands climbed down the mountain slope along Naphegy Street. Raoul Wallenberg wanted to take refuge in the church and advised Hertelendy to do the same. He was vague about his future and said he didn't know what he was in for, Hertelendy reminisced.

The church on Krisztina Square was known in Buda as "fragrant mass" because during Sunday divine services the lady parishioners were enveloped in the aroma of fine French perfumes. When Wallenberg was leaving the church, he was seen by Dr Imre Szabo, a church priest; Soltan Lizka and Miklos Nagy, chaplains; Jozsef Paletta, the parish priest of

the chapel, and Nogradi, the vestry guard. They were the last to see him.

A memorandum

Since about that time Raoul Wallenberg disappeared from the scene. After a while, however, his Swedish relatives and friends began to make inquiries about his fate. Official Stockholm repeatedly asked Moscow about his whereabouts but got contradictory answers. At first the Soviet side said that Wallenberg and a group of others had been detained and taken away to safety where they were under Soviet troops' protection. Then the Swedish side was unexpectedly informed that Wallenberg was not to be found on the Soviet territory and his whereabouts were unknown. It was only after the 20th CPSU Congress, which initiated the campaign of exposing the lawless practices of Stalinism, that there arose the conditions for an objective investigation of the Wallenberg case.

Today it is perfectly obvious that Abakumov, the then Minister of State Security, committed a malfeasance



Eichmann and his victims

by holding Wallenberg in prison and arbitrarily deciding his fate. The investigation revealed that Abakumov and his accomplices deliberately held back information about Wallenberg and then destroyed the dossier on him in order to cover up the traces of their crimes. (Abakumov was condemned and sentenced to capital punishment by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court.)

At a reception, the ubiquitous Western correspondents elbowed their way to Khrushchev through the crowd. Khrushchev enjoyed granting interviews, and journalists took advantage of that to clear up certain problems. That time he was asked a difficult question: "Where is Wallenberg, what has happened to him, and why doesn't the Soviet side provide exhaustive explanations on that score?"


Nikita Khrushchev, noted for his skill at repartee, gave the following reply after a moment's pause:

"Well, take the Piskaryovo Cemetery in Leningrad, for instance. It's hard to tell how many people lie buried there. Estimates vary, and we can only guess at the exact figure." And added, as an afterthought: "Many anonymous heroes haven't been found yet, and the identity of many of those missing is still to be established."

Khrushchev was not trying to dodge the question — probably, he had no exact information on the fate of the Swedish diplomat himself, and wanted to look deep into the matter.

In February 1957, R. Soulman, the Swedish ambassador to the Soviet Union, was invited to the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and handed a memorandum the contents of which were rather unusual for routine diplomatic practice. It gave a reply to the request of the then Prime Minister Tage Erlander that whatever information there was about Raoul Wallenberg be thoroughly rechecked.

In compliance with the Swedish government's request, the memorandum said, the Soviet government instructed the relevant agencies to find out about Wallenberg. The agencies rummaged through archives and questioned many people who had anything to do with the Wallenberg case. A thorough check of prison records



The Wallenberg monument in Budapest

revealed a hand-written report by Smoltsov, the chief of the Lubyanka prison sanitary service, to Abakumov, the then Minister of State Security.

"This is to inform you," the report says, "that prisoner Wallenberg died suddenly last night, presumably of heart failure. Being under your orders to keep Wallenberg under my personal supervision, I request instructions as to who is to do the postmortem examination of the body to establish the cause of death.

Colonel Smoltsov, Medical Corps,
Chief of the Sanitary Division"

July 17, 1947

The report bears the following inscription in Smoltsov's hand; "Reported to minister in person. Was told to have the corpse cremated without a postmortem.

Smoltsov"

July 17.

No documentary evidence or eyewitness accounts were found; Smoltsev himself died in 1953. So there is nothing for it but accept the fact that Wallenberg passed away in July 1947 and that the location of his grave is unknown. It was pointed out in the memorandum that the U.S.S.R. government expressed its regret and asked the Swedish government and Raul Wallenberg's relatives to accept its condolences.

Place in history

The February 1957 memorandum of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs is known to experts, journalists and the world public. Published in Volume 1 of the Swedish Foreign Ministry's White Book on Raoul Wallenberg, it is quoted by an American journalist and by the Hungarian paper Magyar Hirlap. This piece of documentary evidence supposed to put an end to all sorts of speculations about Wallenberg's fate. The Wallenberg mystery was finally cleared up, and his name took its fitting place in the history of World War II. Nevertheless, the Soviet side's answer is taken by certain Western quarters as not convincing enough. How could Wallenberg's body been cremated, they argued, if the Lubyanka prison has never had a crematorium? Another argument in favour of his still being alive is that his personal belongings have never been returned to his relatives, and that the "violet-cover NKVD file," which could have helped trace the prisoner's peripeteia, has been either lost or destroyed.

At the time of Stalin tyranny and the undivided sway of persons vested with enormous power, the "trifles" like cremating dead bodies, eliminating prisoners or disposing of their personal belongings were no problem at all. To think how many innocent Soviet people have disappeared without a trace like Wallenberg!

We in the Soviet Union who have suffered so much from the war and from Stalin's tyranny, have every sympathy for those concerned about Wallenberg's fate — for his relatives, above all. Unfortunately, the only answer we can give to the Swedish side's inquiry of 1986 and to other démarches is that already given in 1957 and reaffirmed at the U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry's briefings in 1987-89: Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947. We realize that those who owe Wallenberg their lives and admire his inventiveness and resourcefulness find it hard to resign to this fact. They still hope for a miracle. One can well understand the way they feel. But there is no undoing the past. It is our common duty to build a world worthy of the memory of all humanists who had dedicated themselves to saving people from assassination and Nazi persecutions.

Vladimir Peshchersky

MOSCOW NEWS OCT. 22-29
NO. 42 1958 (6)

WAS 'PATTERSSON' THE SAME PERSON AS WALLENBERG?

VERSION

Vasily ZINKIN, 65, now a pensioner, made this supposition the other day in the Moscow office of the Raoul Wallenberg Society. (He had learned about the Swedish diplomat's mysterious destiny only quite recently from reading "Moscow News".) This is what he said:

Between 1947 and 1951 he worked as the chief accountant of the construction-assembly department of the Omsukchan mining administration (prior to 1950 — Dalstroi Construction Site No. 4) in the Magadan Region, and thus had access to the personal files of prisoners in a camp in the settlement of Galimy.

In late 1947 or early 1948, a prisoner was brought by plane to Omsukchan, a remote area of Kolyma. On the camp list he was designated under the name of "Pattersson" or "Pettersson" (Zinkin doesn't remember the exact spelling) and his nationality was indicated as "English".

"In a confidential talk," Zinkin reminisces, "Major Kislyakovsky, chief of the Omsukchansk district department of the Ministry of State Security, with whom I had good relations, told me about that prisoner. According to him, a foreign diplomat, believed to be in one of the intelligence services, was captured at the very end of the war in Budapest and taken to Moscow by plane. There it became clear, however, that it was a mistake, that he was not the person they were 'hunting' for, that the diplomat was not involved in intelligence work. By that time he had already

passed through investigation in the internal prison of the Ministry of State Security in Lubyanka, and it was decided not to release him. Just in case, he was sentenced to 15 years for espionage, given a different name — 'Pattersson' (or 'Pettersson'), and sent on a special transport first to Magadan and then to Omsukchan. This is how he found himself in this camp. This was confirmed by Senior Lieutenant Bobrov, an official of the Galimy camp. Yet no one knew the diplomat's real name or what country he came from."

Zinkin saw Pattersson both in the camp and on the construction site where he worked as a carpenter in a team of prisoners.

In 1951, Zinkin went on a leave and did not return to Omsukchan. He never heard anything more about Pattersson's destiny, yet he knows that in late 1951-early 1952 all political prisoners

were taken to Magadan and then redirected to the camps of the Berlag system.

V. Zinkin's information bears striking similarity to the events surrounding Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance, and was received with great interest by the Moscow office of the Raoul Wallenberg Society which sent an inquiry to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and its administration in the Magadan Region with a request that the Pattersson case be checked and his fate explained.

For its part, our newspaper asks all those who know anything about this person to contact us (telephone: 292-20-91). The address where Pattersson (Pettersson) served his sentence from 1948 to 1951 is:

Magadan, Dalstroi USVITL Omsukchan ITL
OLP Galimy (Lower building camp)

Date 30 Sept 1993

WALLENBERG ACTED AS U.S. AGENT IN SAVING JEWS -CIA

LANGLEY, Virginia, Sept 30 (Reuter) - Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who saved thousands of Jews during the Nazi Holocaust, was working for a semi-clandestine U.S. agency, possibly arousing Soviet suspicions and leading to his arrest and subsequent disappearance, the CIA said on Thursday.

Wallenberg, who was assigned to the Swedish legation in Budapest in 1944 by his government, received money as well as orders and information useful to his work from the U.S. War Refugee Board, the CIA said in a newly declassified report.

The board's "clandestine character...could have aroused Soviet suspicions and led to his disappearance," said the 1981 study by an author whose name was withheld by the spy agency.

Wallenberg is widely credited with saving the lives of more than 20,000 Hungarian Jews while posted in Budapest.

He was arrested by the Soviets in 1945 and never seen again. Some believe he is still alive in a Soviet prison.

Wallenberg saved lives chiefly by extending to Jews the diplomatic protection of Sweden which was neutral during the war.

Often using false documents and bribes, he enabled thousands to leave Hungary and protected thousands more by installing them in houses that he purchased and set up as sanctuaries under the Swedish flag.

The State Department in 1979 accepted partial responsibility for Wallenberg's fate by admitting in a document given Soviet officials in Washington that the United States had provided funds for his programme to save Jews.

But the newly released report appears to go beyond that disclosure. Wallenberg was "our choice" for the posting to Budapest, Herschel Johnson, the American minister in Stockholm at the time, said in a 1944 cable to the State Department quoted in the report.

Wallenberg himself "felt that he was carrying out a mission" for the refugee board and viewed his diplomatic posting as "his cover," the report said, citing the cable.

The Swedish Foreign Office "felt that by assigning Wallenberg to Budapest, it was cooperating fully with the furtherance of an 'American programme'," the report said.

Pressed by Sweden and the United States, the Soviet government said in 1957 that a "man named Raoul Wallenberg died of a heart attack in July 1947" in the KGB's Lubyanka prison in Moscow.

In 1988, during a visit to Moscow, some of Wallenberg's friends and relatives were given some of the diplomat's personal effects including his passport and some notebooks.

A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said at that time that Wallenberg's arrest had been "a tragic mistake that has never been corrected."

But some of the diplomat's friends and relatives continue to insist Wallenberg might yet be alive in a Russian prison.

CIA says Wallenberg acted for US

ANNIKA SAVILL, Diplomatic Editor

THE CIA has admitted what Sweden has known for decades: that Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who saved up to 20,000 Hungarian Jews, was working not for Sweden but for an agency of the US government.

But it stopped short of admitting that Wallenberg was recruited and paid by an agent of the precursor to the CIA.

The declassified CIA report, written 12 years ago, said Wallenberg was paid by and taking orders from the US War Refugee Board. In an admission of partial US responsibility for his disappearance in 1945 and near-certain subsequent death, it added that the board's "clandestine character ... could have aroused

Soviet suspicions and led to his disappearance".

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nothing very remarkable".

Visitors to the Holocaust museum in Washington also know Wallenberg worked for the US Refugee Board. A thin volume entitled *Raoul Wallenberg: Missing Diplomat*, classified by the US Library of Congress as "juvenile literature", states: "His diplomatic papers were false anyway. He was really on assignment for the American War Refugee Board," adding "the board sent a man to Sweden to hire someone to initiate a Hungarian rescue effort."

Swedish diplomats have heard testimony from Russian sources that Wallenberg was

shot in a Soviet prison in 1947. "That's just one report," said a Swedish official. "We don't know if he is alive or dead." Had he survived, Mr Wallenberg would have been 81 last August.

The New York Times _____
The Los Angeles Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Washington Times _____
USA Today _____
Associated Press _____
UPI _____
Reuter _____
The Independent (UK)
Date 1 Oct 1993

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CIA SAYS WALLENBERG ACTED FOR US ANNIKA SAVILL LONDON - The CIA has admitted what Sweden has known for decades: that Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who saved up to 20,000 Hungarian Jews, was working not for Sweden but for an agency of the US government.

But it stopped short of admitting that Wallenberg was recruited and paid by an agent of the precursor to the CIA.

The declassified CIA report, written 12 years ago, said Wallenberg was paid by and taking orders from the US War Refugee Board. In an admission of partial US responsibility for his disappearance in 1945 and near-certain subsequent death, it added that the board's "clandestine character . . . could have aroused Soviet suspicions and led to his disappearance".

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His role in US rescue efforts may
have doomed the missing diplomat

TOP SECRET

(SUMMER 1981)

WALLENBERG: A LINGERING TRAGEDY OF WORLD WAR II

January 1981 marked the 36th anniversary of the disappearance of Raoul Gustaf Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat credited with saving thousands of Hungarian Jews during World War II. Arrested by the Soviets in 1945, Wallenberg's fate remains a tantalizing mystery fed by continuing reports that he survives somewhere in the Soviet gulag. Pressure from successive Swedish governments as well as recent queries from the United States and Israel have failed to extract a satisfactory explanation from Moscow. Neither Stalin, Khrushchev, or the current Soviet leadership have provided answers to why Wallenberg was arrested and detained, or what fate befell him. Although the definitive story may never be told, a look into the declassified documents of the US War Refugee Board, which actually sponsored Wallenberg's project, provides some interesting insights into the clandestine character of that organization—a factor that could have aroused Soviet suspicions and led to his disappearance.

In 1979, the US State Department accepted partial responsibility for Wallenberg's fate by admitting in a so-called "non paper" presented to the Soviet chargé in Washington that the US had provided funds for the program to save Hungarian Jews. The Department failed to reveal, however, that Wallenberg's contact man at the US legation in Stockholm, Iver C. Olsen, was a member of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the parent organization of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Hungarian project was one of about a half-dozen similar operations sponsored by the War Refugee Board—not the OSS—in an effort to save European Jewry from the Nazi holocaust. At great personal risk, Wallenberg extended neutralist Sweden's diplomatic protection to Hungarian Jews, often using false documents and bribery, and sometimes resorting to bold deceptions. He is credited with having saved at least 20,000 lives. Mentioned for the Nobel peace prize for the first time in 1948, his name has been put forward almost every year since.

Wallenberg was born to the recently widowed Baroness Maj von Dardel of Stockholm on August 4, 1912. His father was Jewish and was related to the wealthy Swedish banking family headed by Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg. Earlier generations of the Wallenberg family had enjoyed distinguished careers in the diplomatic service. One of Raoul's grand uncles had served as Swedish Minister to the Legation in the United States and another was Foreign Minister during World War I. His aunt was married to Colonel William Calvin of Connecticut, a former US military attache in Stockholm.

Wallenberg was an architect by profession and had studied at the University of Michigan in 1934 and 1935. US diplomatic correspondence following his disappearance indicates that he was well connected in Washington and may have been

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personally acquainted with President Roosevelt. He had been working with a firm in Stockholm in June 1944 when the Swedish Foreign Office approached him to take an assignment at the Swedish Legation in Budapest. Accepting the assignment, Wallenberg told the American Minister in Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, that he wanted to save lives and was not interested merely in filing reports to the Foreign Office. Both Johnson and Iver Olsen, who was also the War Refugee Board representative in Stockholm, were impressed with Wallenberg and described him as "our choice" for the job.

Johnson informed the Department in a cable on June 29, 1944 that the Swedish Foreign Office felt that by assigning Wallenberg to Budapest it was cooperating fully with the furtherance of an "American program." According to Johnson, Wallenberg felt that he was carrying out a mission for the US War Refugee Board—implying that he viewed his posting as an attache to the Swedish Legation as his cover. Consequently, the newly appointed attache requested that Washington cable full instructions outlining his duties, limits of authority and extent of financial support. Johnson recommended that Wallenberg not be restricted by a "concrete program," but be given rather general instructions that would allow him to deal with situations as they developed. He further informed Washington that arrangements had been made to communicate with Wallenberg in Budapest through the Foreign Office in Stockholm.

Wallenberg's instructions were passed in a War Refugee Board cable relayed in July by the State Department to Stockholm. They included an account of how much funding was available, a description of the various refugee escape channels that might be used to smuggle out Hungarian Jews and a list of possible friendly contacts in the Budapest area. Olsen was told to pass on to Wallenberg as much of this information as he deemed advisable. The Board's message also said that:

"while he (Wallenberg) cannot of course, act as the Board's representative, nor purport to act in its name, he can, whenever advisable, indicate that as a Swede he is free to communicate with Stockholm where a representative of the Board is stationed. He may thus express his willingness to lay before the Board's representative specific proposals if in any particular case he should deem so doing to be advisable, or if by reason of the nature of the proposals Olsen's or the Board's approval is necessary."

In order to appreciate Wallenberg's accomplishments it is necessary to understand the plight of European Jewry in the spring of 1944. The German army had suffered devastating losses in the East and the long anticipated Allied invasion of Europe seemed imminent. Despite accounts of the horrors of Nazi extermination camps, most Jews, particularly those in Hungary who had survived in one of Europe's most anti-semitic countries, were reluctant to believe the thoroughness of Hitler's "final solution." Many Jews fled from Germany, Slovakia, and Poland to Hungary despite its history of anti-semitism and its reputation as a loyal ally of Nazi Germany. Anti-semitism long had been an element of life in Hungary. In 1924, long before Hitler came to power, Hungary promulgated the first discriminatory laws against Jews.

Nevertheless, as the war drew to a close, the Jewish population in Hungary increased as a result of the influx of refugees. For their part, many Hungarian Jews thought Germany soon would pull back its forces and negotiate a surrender. The Horthy government certainly would have followed Berlin's lead. Instead, Horthy was deposed and on March 19, 1944 elements of the German army entered Budapest and the one-time ally for all practical purposes, became an occupied country under the

Szalasi regime. A few days later, Adolf Eichmann, architect of the final solution, arrived in Budapest along with some of the most infamous officers of the Sonder Einsatzkommandos—the special section of the Gestapo charged with the extinction of Jews. Germany was going to lose the war but efforts to complete the extermination of the Jews was accorded top priority.

In spite of these developments, most Jews refused to take any defensive action. Efforts to form a resistance, spearheaded by young Hungarian Zionists, were only partially successful because the majority of Jews would not take up arms. The docility of the Hungarian Jews, choosing to believe that the Germans eventually would abandon their extermination plans, was turned to Nazi advantage by Eichmann. When Jews by the thousands were turned out of their homes and herded into ghettos and staging areas for transport to the death camps, Jewish leaders often went among their co-religionists urging them not to panic and to cooperate with Nazi and Hungarian authorities. As a result, during the spring and summer of 1944, some 800,000 Jews were transported from Hungary and executed.

Earlier that year, stories of the holocaust had begun to reach Washington, Stockholm and other world capitals. While few grasped the extent of the horror, President Roosevelt put into action plans to assist the remaining Jews to escape and to discourage further atrocities, particularly in countries allied to Germany. Roosevelt issued a statement warning the Hungarians and other German allies that the US was determined to see that those who shared the guilt of Nazi policies be punished. Similar resolutions were passed by both the House and Senate. Copies of both were given to Wallenberg with the instruction that whenever possible he should call them to the attention of the Hungarian authorities.

The War Refugee Board was established in January 1944 as part of the Executive Office of the President. The Board was composed of the Secretaries of State, Treasury and War. The Board's mission was to combat the Nazi efforts to exterminate captive people because of their race, religion, or political beliefs. The first Executive Director of the Board was John Pehle, assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury. He was succeeded a year later by Brigadier General William O'Dwyer who directed the Board until its dissolution in September 1945.

The records of the Board suggest that the experience gained by the Administration in setting up the Office of Strategic Services a few years earlier was used to establish the new organization. Special representatives served the Board in strategic areas in or near the European mainland—Turkey, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, the UK, Italy, and North Africa. Their communications were classified and the Board's representatives and contacts in enemy territory—sometimes referred to as "agents"—often had cover. Although those of the Board's records dealing with Wallenberg fail to reveal any connection with any intelligence organization, a still classified list of OSS employees identifies Iver C. Olsen, the Board's representative in Stockholm and the link between Wallenberg and Washington, as a member of the Special Intelligence Branch, OSS. Olsen was a diplomat and Board representative; [REDACTED] in the fall of 1944, as well. If Olsen's identity was known to Soviet intelligence—[REDACTED]—it is possible that Wallenberg's contacts with American intelligence may have aroused Soviet suspicion.

Wallenberg arrived in Budapest in July and immediately rented a 16-room office which he placed under the extraterritoriality of the Swedish Legation. This office had a

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great deal more space than he needed for clerical functions, of course, and soon provided sanctuary for several prominent religious leaders. His advent had coincided with a temporary suspension in the transport of Jews to the camps. In two months prior to his arrival, however, Hungarian police had turned over 400,000 to the SS. With the temporary suspension order, local Hungarian authorities agreed to proposals by the War Refugee Board, the Swedish Red Cross and the Jewish Agency of Palestine that some Jews be allowed to emigrate and others be extended the protection of neutral legations in Budapest. Wallenberg seized on this and began acquiring properties throughout the city which he placed under the Swedish banner as sanctuaries for thousands of Jews.

A dispatch from Iver Olsen in Stockholm in August reflected the zeal with which Wallenberg approached his task. Olsen wrote John Pehle, Executive Director of the Board:

"I get the impression that the Swedish Foreign Office is somewhat uneasy about Wallenberg's activities in Budapest, and perhaps feel that he has jumped in with too big a splash. They would prefer, of course, to approach the Jewish problem in the finest traditions of European diplomacy, which wouldn't help too much."

In the same dispatch he relates how Wallenberg "left in a hell of a hurry with no instructions and no funds." The Board had ample funds but getting the monies to Wallenberg may have caused some problems as he frantically acquired properties and bribed local officials. Dealing with Hungarian authorities Wallenberg at first experienced considerable success; for example, the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm informed the Swedish Foreign Office in August that the Hungarian government agreed to authorize the emigration to Sweden of Jews recently granted citizenship by the Swedish king. Other Jews could emigrate, as well, provided they had relatives or long standing business connections in Sweden. Wallenberg screened thousands of Jews who might fit the criteria for emigration under the Hungarian edict and found some 5,000 of 9,000 eligible. He issued the necessary documentation for those who qualified and tried to protect the rest from being conscripted into labor battalions or transported to Germany by placing them in houses under the Swedish flag.

By the end of September, an additional 5,000 persons had been extended Swedish protection. According to a cable from Minister Johnson in Stockholm, deportations from Hungary to the death camps had officially stopped and Jews in Budapest appeared to be "reasonably safe for the time being." Wallenberg was less optimistic, as the German occupiers began extending their authority and Hungarian officials caved in. In some of the more remote concentration camps in Hungary, for example, German forces continued to commandeer Jewish prisoners for deportation.

When the deportations "officially" resumed, Wallenberg doubled his efforts to establish more "Swedish houses" and even sequestered some in private homes throughout Budapest. These Jews would otherwise have been deported or swept into labor battalions by the Nazis or their local adherents, the Hungarian Arrow Cross. According to some accounts, Wallenberg cooperated with the Swiss Legation and Hazalah, a small Jewish resistance group, in duplicating protection certificates and establishing sanctuaries. Several times, he reportedly faced down Nazi and Hungarian authorities trying to deport Jews under his governments's protection. According to a Stockholm press account forwarded to Washington by Minister Johnson, Wallenberg confronted armed Hungarian troops who had entered one of his houses in search of

labor conscripts and warned "none leaves this place as long as I live." Thus balked the troops withdrew, later their commander returned to talk with Wallenberg. After an hour, according to the story, Wallenberg received a written pledge from the commander saying that Jews under Swedish protection were exempt from labor service.

One of the most famous episodes involves Wallenberg racing a deportation train that was headed for the death camps in Germany. Apparently the Gestapo had herded several people with Swedish protection on a train already crowded with other Jews. Informed of this, Wallenberg raced to the Budapest railway station only to discover that the train had departed. He pursued it by car to a small town near the Hungarian border, confronted the train commander and demanded the release of the documented captives. The commander relented and Wallenberg returned to Budapest with "his" people—the rest of the passengers were not so fortunate.

The effectiveness of the Hungarian government waned in the months before the Soviet occupation in January 1945. No one was safe. Jews and other unfortunate minorities fell easy prey to the Gestapo, the Arrow Cross and other thugs. Wallenberg was harassed and it was rumored that the Arrow Cross had put a price on his head. His car was stolen and once his office staff was arrested. The confusion, however, probably contributed to the success of some of his efforts. Bogus documentation replete with forged stamps and seals was effective in persuading military authorities and police to release prisoners. Many Hungarian Jews owe their lives to the documents skillfully crafted by Wallenberg and others.

By December, the relief effort guided by Wallenberg had reached considerable proportions, with 335 employees in addition to about 40 physicians, house governors, and miscellaneous helpers. He had rented at least ten houses—one account claims 30—to shelter Jews and had two hospitals with a total of 150 beds, along with several soup kitchens and a ration card system for distributing food. Wallenberg had convinced the Hungarian authorities that Jews with foreign documentation already serving in labor battalions in Hungary should be returned to Budapest. Some 15,000 were. Through the intervention of Wallenberg and his staff over 2,000 others were snatched from deportation points at the last minute. According to a report from the Swedish Foreign Office, Jews bearing Swedish protective passports fared better than the other wards of foreign missions in Hungary.

Nevertheless, the situation in Budapest became even more dangerous as the Nazis and their Arrow Cross sympathizers made a last ditch attempt to annihilate those Jews still alive. Wallenberg devoted all his energies to caring for those under his protection and reportedly cooperated with nascent Jewish resistance groups. According to the account of a Polish officer who spent 15 years in Soviet prisons and who knew Wallenberg, the Swede spent the early weeks in January 1945 rounding up weapons for the small band of Jewish resistance fighters in Budapest. Some of these Hazalahs donned Gestapo garb and actually guarded properties used for quartering Jews.

By mid-January the first contingents of the Soviet army reached the environs of Budapest. One historian of this period claims that when a Soviet patrol visited the Swedish Legation on January 13 Wallenberg asked to be put in touch with the local Soviet commander. Four days later, according to a press account, Wallenberg, escorted by Soviet military personnel, appeared at the Jewish "relief office" in Budapest. He said he was on his way to see Marshal Rodion Malinovsky. "I'm going," he said but "I don't know if its as their guest or their prisoner."

Another version of Wallenberg's disappearance is attributed to a Latvian named Krisko who worked as a Russian interpreter at the Swedish Legation in Budapest at the time. The Legation had employed Krisko to handle Russian traffic after Sweden accepted responsibility for Soviet interests when Hungary declared war on the USSR. Krisko and Wallenberg were arrested about the same time and held at a Soviet military facility outside Budapest. On January 20 they were flown to Moscow. This was the first time they had seen each other since before their arrest and, according to Krisko, Wallenberg, who was sitting under guard several feet away, nodded in recognition. Wallenberg, "looked buoyant, probably thinking his arrest was a misunderstanding." A few days later the Swedish Legation in Moscow was informed by the Soviets that Wallenberg was under their "protection."

As the plight of Jewish refugees improved following the Nazi collapse in Hungary, communications between Stockholm and the War Refugee Board diminished; it was April before Minister Johnson reported to Washington that Sweden had asked for US assistance in determining Wallenberg's fate. He said there had been unconfirmed radio reports that Wallenberg had been murdered, presumably by the Arrow Cross, and asked that our Embassy in Moscow be instructed to request assistance from the Soviet government. In reaction to Johnson's cable, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau reminded Secretary of State Edward Stettin of his own personal interest in Wallenberg in a handwritten note on April 4. Correspondence concerning Wallenberg tapered off over the summer and the War Refugee Board was dissolved in September.

Swedes loyal to Wallenberg, however, were loath to let the issue rest. A Wallenberg Committee was formed to pressure the Stockholm government to continue to query the Soviets. In the early post-war years, less than enthusiastic socialist governments in Stockholm tried to avoid provoking the Soviets. Nevertheless, after several attempts to elicit a response from Moscow, a functionary at the Soviet Legation in Stockholm said in 1946 that Wallenberg was "being taken care of for some foolish things he had done." Another story claimed that Wallenberg had been convicted by a Soviet court as an American spy and sentenced to 25 years.

There are a number of things that may have caused the Soviets to doubt Wallenberg's credentials. His modus operandi certainly exceeded standard diplomatic practice. The falsification of documents for Jewish refugees, the use of bribes, and his successful use of bluff and bravado on numerous occasions were probably known to them. His familiarity with the Soviet interests section of the Swedish Legation, implied by the interpreter Krisko who also was accused by the Soviets of being an American spy, may have increased those suspicions. The generally muddled condition of Wallenberg's bona fides is reflected in a portion of a digest cable from Allied headquarters in Caserta, Italy in May 1945. According to a source in Budapest (possibly Brigadier General Bonner Key, OSS):

"General Key has asked the Soviet military authorities for information regarding the whereabouts of Wallenberg, Meier, and Feller. The instruction in the Department's 12 for Budapest will be complied with as far as possible, but the fact that the Soviet authorities may well have conclusive proof of pro-Nazi collaboration on the part of Feller and possibly of Meier and Wallenberg should be of interest to the Department."

The reference to collaboration with the Nazi's probably referred to Wallenberg's use of bribes to gain the release of Jews and other refugees.

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Some of the communications passed by the War Refugee Board representative in Stockholm through the Swedish Foreign Office to Wallenberg also may have aroused suspicion. For example, shortly after Wallenberg arrived in Hungary, the Department of State asked Olsen in Stockholm to request him to forward to a Hungarian businessman a message from his partner in Los Angeles. The communication was cryptic with numerous references to the reputed partner's personal effects—ruby cuff links, his wife's gold bracelet, a brooch with green stone, etc. The businessman was to be told that he could expect to go to Switzerland soon and should "apply for a visa immediately." The Department's explanation for the message was that the two men were business associates and that the partner in Budapest soon was to go to Switzerland on banking business. The cable cautioned Olsen, however, that if he thought it was inappropriate for any reason to pass the message he was to advise the Board, which would reconsider the action. Although there is no indication that the message was passed to Wallenberg or by him to anyone else, such instructions, if compromised, could have raised questions about his assignment.

Efforts to get the Soviets to provide an explanation of what happened to Wallenberg span the 36 years since his disappearance. Stalin reportedly took a personal interest in investigating Wallenberg's case but failed to reveal his fate. When Khrushchev visited Stockholm in 1956 he was presented a petition by Wallenberg's mother and the Soviet leader promised to "clear up the matter." Subsequently, Moscow officially announced that a "man named Raoul Wallenberg died of a heart attack in July 1947" in Lubyanka prison. The Swedes requested the remains of the body—only to be told it had been cremated—despite the usual Soviet practice of burying deceased prisoners with their number plate affixed to a leg. In the Brezhnev era, Soviet officials seem torn between the Lubyanka story and another that asserts that Wallenberg was killed by Nazis or Hungarian fascists before the fall of Budapest in revenge for saving Jews.

A number of reports from prisoners released by the Soviets over the years since the 1950s trace Wallenberg's odyssey through the Soviet prison system. Former inmates of Lubyanka, Vladimir, Aleksandrov Central, Verkhneuralsk, and other prisons have reported meeting Wallenberg or of knowing some other prisoner who knew him. One of the most recent and credible accounts is that of Jan Kaplan, a former inmate of Butryka prison, who wrote his daughter in Israel that while in the prison infirmary in 1977 he had met a Swede who had been in several different prisons over the past 30 years. According to Kaplan, the Swede "was in pretty good condition." This report was subsequently relayed to Stockholm and the Swedish government sent yet another note to the Soviets in January 1979. The response: "No Further Information."

Nevertheless, the Israeli government felt that Kaplan's tale merited further investigation and Prime Minister Begin urged President Carter to ask Brezhnev about Wallenberg when the two leaders met at the Summit in Vienna in 1979. Members of the US delegation queried their Soviet counterparts to no avail. An earlier attempt to bring highlevel US pressure to bear on the Soviets may have occurred in 1973. According to Nina Lagergren, Wallenberg's half-sister who visited Washington in the summer of 1979, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger vetoed instructions from his staff to the US Ambassador in Moscow to demand information regarding Wallenberg. If so, Kissinger probably sensed that such a demand would have been detrimental to the spirit of detente. Lagergren's visit, however, coincided with the "non-paper" mentioned earlier which admitted partial US funding for Wallenberg's project.

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role may have doomed him

In January 1980—the 35th anniversary of Wallenberg's disappearance—a group representing Wallenberg demonstrated outside the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm. The Swedish Foreign Ministry issued a statement reviewing Wallenberg's role as a humanitarian and informed the Soviets that Sweden's demand for a complete disclosure concerning his fate remained unsatisfied. The government also released previously classified information detailing immediate postwar attempts to gain Wallenberg's freedom. The documents confirmed the unwillingness of Sweden's post war governments to antagonize Moscow over Wallenberg. According to press reports, one document indicated that Stockholm had turned down an offer by former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson to intercede with the Soviets to gain Wallenberg's release.

On the 36th anniversary of Wallenberg's disappearance in January 1981, some 350 persons attended a "hearing" in Stockholm sponsored by the Swedish Wallenberg Association. Marcus Wallenberg, the patriarch of the Swedish banking dynasty, the British and Israeli ambassadors, and the wife of US Senator Daniel Moynihan, attended. Several former Soviet prisoners testified to direct or indirect contact with a Swedish prisoner long after 1947, when the Soviets claim Wallenberg died. Gideon Hausner, chairman of the Israeli Wallenberg Committee and the prosecutor of Adolph Eichmann, told the audience that he had seen no convincing evidence that Wallenberg had died. On the contrary, Hausner felt that there was "considerable material" to contradict the Soviet version of Wallenberg's fate. Hausner also reminded demonstrators that Wallenberg had been appointed to his task by President Roosevelt and declared "we don't want to relieve America of the responsibility to pursue the case." Hausner's comments were echoed by Simon Wiesenthal, founder of the Jewish Documentation Center in Vienna.

In all probability, such activities merely will annoy the Soviets, producing few results. It would seem unlikely that the present regime in Moscow would call attention to the fact that Wallenberg's life, or 36 years of it, had been forfeited to their whim. What could they say? That his arrest was simply a misunderstanding carried out by overzealous security personnel operating under a blanket order to arrest all suspicious foreigners in Budapest? Then what about his early years of detention? Thousands of German prisoners of war were detained in the Soviet Union for years after the war. Had Wallenberg been returned before 1950, for example, his detention might have been attributed to administrative error.

A possible opportunity to get a definitive answer to the Wallenberg affair may occur when a change in leadership takes place in the Soviet Union . . . a time when criticism of the previous regime is sometimes permitted. Until then, the true fate of Raoul Wallenberg may never be clear, but his humanitarian accomplishments are irrefutable.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations in the "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under each comment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark, insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM:				DOCUMENT NUMBER	
FI/AN				DOCUMENT DATE 7 Nov 1956	
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. WIP 1031			DEC 14 1956	J	NOTE: If a copy or attachments are removed from the attached document, note the location of the copy and/or attachment hereon. If this <u>RECORD COPY</u> is to be retained in the files at the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan. Pls note Request. 201 subject please FILE TITLE FILE NUMBER 201 ENCLOSURE DATE PROCESSED ABSTRACT X INDEX X
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FORM NO. 610a
1 OCT. 55

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VIA AIR POUCH
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [REDACTED]

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CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 7 December 1956

FROM [REDACTED]

SUBJECT { GENERAL [REDACTED]
SPECIFIC [REDACTED]

REF: DIR 42183

ACTION REQUIRED: For information and for possible notification re paragraph 2. [REDACTED]

1. I accompanied [REDACTED] to subject meeting at the [REDACTED] partly as a gesture of courtesy to [REDACTED] and partly for the sake of getting to know him better. I felt certain, moreover, that the regular [REDACTED] pattern of contact is now sufficiently established as to guarantee that my presence on this one occasion would not disturb it. [REDACTED] had not yet returned from about a week's trip to Switzerland, and I presume other places, to collect all the intelligence he can from other [REDACTED] contacts. Apart from the routine delivery of intelligence items, to which [REDACTED] himself did not contribute, two topics of conversation were of sufficient interest to report.
2. I presented [REDACTED] with a sanitized copy of reference from which I had eliminated the query as to whether the Swedish diplomat in Bulgaria could make a trip by rail to Bucharest to report on the volume and nature of traffic between Rumania and Bulgaria, because I preferred to handle this part of the request orally. [REDACTED] did not seem to be exactly certain as to what Swedish diplomat might be accredited to both Bulgaria and Rumania, but it was the belief that the present Swedish Ambassador to Moscow, Rolf Ragnarsson Sohlman, covers both those satellites and possibly some others. (We have just confirmed that Sohlman is not only Ambassador to the USSR but to Bulgaria and Rumania as well, and also Afghanistan!) His comments concerning this Ambassador, Sohlman, were of particular interest. He stated that this man who has a Russian wife, likes Moscow and hopes to spend the rest of his life there. There were strong overtones of pro-Soviet views on the part of Sohlman in [REDACTED] statement that this man is quite useless for accurate reporting purposes and that serious consideration is being given to kicking him upstairs into a [REDACTED]

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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7 Dec 56
page 2

Swedish Ambassadorship at the United Nations. When I discussed this matter later with [redacted] the latter said that this report was totally at variance with the official line he received from the Foreign Office where Ambassador Sohlman is regarded as a great Russian expert, very close to the Foreign Minister Unden and frequently called back to brief the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office ostensibly, at least, desires to retain Sohlman in his present post at Moscow as long as possible because of his great value. A vacant Swedish Ambassadorship at the United Nations (the ECE) has moreover very recently been filled. The discrepancy between these two accounts is so startling that it deserves investigation, which will be pursued as discreetly as possible here, but any Headquarters information or views should be welcome. It may be that Ambassador Bohlen has already reported on Sohlman. One possible explanation for this divergence is the rabidly partisan nature of [redacted] conservative politics. It is quite conceivable that any friend of Unden is anathema to [redacted] who, moreover, has also from time to time made critical comments to [redacted] concerning the Foreign Office generally.

3. [redacted] comments concerning the Raoul Wallenberg case on which he worked personally for the Foreign Office were also of considerable interest. He said that the Foreign Office energy in pursuing this case was largely the result of the strong pressure of public opinion both through the press and through the special Raoul Wallenberg association. [redacted] made it clear, as he had previously stated to Newbold, that the Swedish Government expects another rejection for their latest note to the Soviet Union on this subject, and that the Swedish Government would be left with no recourse but to publish a White Paper. [redacted] had previously stated to Newbold that such publication might be somewhat embarrassing to the Foreign Office because of its probable revelation that until approximately 3 years ago the Foreign Office had not pursued the question with sufficient vigor, although since that time the Foreign Office has been extremely vigorous in its notes of protest and inquiry.) [redacted] further revealed that he had personally spent 3 months in Germany about a year ago interrogating German returnees from the Soviet camp at Vorkuta and was satisfied of the positive identification of Wallenberg and verification of his presence in Vorkuta by at least one German who had been Wallenberg's cell mate. [redacted] was therefore positive that he could trace Wallenberg's actual existence up to a certain date, though when Newbold suggested that this might be as recent as 1949-51, [redacted] replied "No, much earlier, but I am not at liberty to tell you the exact date" when Wallenberg's actual survival was last certified. [redacted] is certain that Raoul Wallenberg is now dead.

7 December 56

Distribution:
3-Headquarters
2-[redacted]

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RESP. NO.

December 14, 1956

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

DATE

REF : JOINT WEEKKA NO. 50, SECTION I and Embassy Despatch 354, October 1, 1956

For Dept. Use Only	ACTOR 2	DEPT 1. 2	C/L 6	1. 1	S/P 1	U/L 1. 1	U/L 1
	REC 26	OTHER 15	USO. 16	Army 2	Navy 3	Air 3	US. H. 15

In a surprising press release issued late in the afternoon of December 11, the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the Soviet Ambassador Konstantin RODIONOV would soon leave Stockholm. Noting that Ambassador Rodionov had that day called on Acting Foreign Minister LINDELL, the Foreign Office press release explained that the Soviet Ambassador volunteered that after nearly seven years in Sweden he had asked his Government to be relieved of his duties as Ambassador to Sweden, and his Government had decided to grant his request. The press release concluded with the information that Ambassador Rodionov would soon leave for Moscow "to take up other duties there."

This announcement by the Swedish Foreign Office followed closely the strong Swedish press protests against Ambassador Rodionov's sudden return to Stockholm on December 7 after ten weeks of home leave which began shortly before sentence was passed in the ERICSSON spy case. Anatole Ericsson, known here as the radar spy, was the convicted defendant in the third major espionage case involving the Soviet Union during Rodionov's term as Ambassador here. Social Democratic, Liberal and Conservative papers all termed the Ambassador's return an insult to Sweden. They called on the Government to make known to Moscow how undesirable Rodionov had become, because, in the minds of the Swedish public, he was directly associated with the repeated cases of espionage involving persons attached to the Soviet Embassy or other official Soviet agencies in Stockholm. The fact that the Soviet Government had bluntly and callously denied any connection with any of these spy cases (Hilding ANDERSSON in 1951, Fritiof ENBOM in 1952 or Anatole ERICSSON in 1956), despite its obvious involvement, appeared to further aggravate Rodionov's position.

Ambassador Rodionov suddenly returned to Stockholm from the USSR on December 7 accompanied by Professor Nikolai SEMJONOV, one of the two winners of the 1956 Nobel prize for chemistry, and the first Soviet citizen to be awarded a Nobel prize. Rodionov performed his functions at the Nobel awards ceremonies on December 10 before advising the Foreign Office of his intention to leave.

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REPORTER

INFORMATION COPY

Retain in divisional files or destroy in accordance with security regulations.

W.F.H/CE

VIA AIR POWER
Specialty Air Service

DISPATCH NO. [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 30 November 1956

FROM [REDACTED]

SUBJECT { GENERAL [REDACTED]
SPECIFIC Current Status

REFS: A. [REDACTED] 21 September 1956
B. [REDACTED] 10 August 1956

ACTION REQUIRED: For information and Headquarters' comments on our use of [REDACTED]

1. Since receipt of Reference A we have developed [REDACTED] along the lines of our suggestions set forth in Reference B. In general, we are pleased with [REDACTED] particularly his enthusiasm and spirit. He is as yet some distance removed from the category of a fully active asset, but his performance and interests in the work gives us reason to believe we are moving in the proper direction.

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] is now cultivating the American student population in [REDACTED] and at present has seen or met over 50 of these individuals. We have already forwarded by separate dispatch the official list of the students attending the 1956-1957 International Graduate School Session. Additionally, [REDACTED] was able to inform the writer regarding the inappropriate conduct of an American attending the session, which information was passed to the American Consul. The Consul's prompt action, it is believed, prevented a very uncomplimentary situation in the Swedish Press.

4. [REDACTED] is in correspondence with a Russian student whom he met in Leningrad. This subject will be treated in a separate dispatch.

5. Subject has been briefed on our general [REDACTED] requirements, and

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

Page 2 to [REDACTED]
30 November 1956

It is hoped Subject can contribute to our coverage of this activity. He has also been briefed on our [REDACTED] interests, but we anticipate little return in this area except by chance.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] at the same time we appreciate the opportunity inherent in such action to place him in an activity where he might well come to the attention and awaken the interests of the RIS. We would therefore appreciate your advice as to how Subject's taking such a step can best be handled so that X number of years from now it will not be a barrier to him in any other field of endeavor.

7. We are about to give [REDACTED] a list of subjects (i.e. the Roul Wallenberg, [REDACTED] etc. case) for him to cover in the Swedish press. This is being done to try and increase the scope and we hope the depth of our coverage of overt items which can be used operationally or in support of Station interests.

8. As a long range program, we are hoping that [REDACTED] may be able to obtain a visa for study in the USSR. He is personally desirous of doing this and is also aware of the operational potential of a prolonged stay in the USSR. At the moment we are waiting for the international situation to calm down before having [REDACTED] inquire into this matter. This subject was discussed in some detail with [REDACTED] recently who kindly provided us with the current situation regarding visas for American students in the USSR and other factors affecting such a tour of study.

[REDACTED]

29 November 1956

Distribution:

3 - Hqs.

2 - [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

55

VIA AIR
Priority Air or Sea Route

DISPATCH NO. 


CLASSIFICATION


TO Chief, WE

DATE 29 June 1956

FROM 

SUBJECT { GENERAL
 SPECIFIC

Visit of Members of Supreme Soviet to Stockholm, May 1956

Enclosed is  report on a press conference held by
members of Subject delegation.


26 June 1956

Encl: 1 report

Distribution:

5 Headquarters w/1 encl.
 1 encl.

1 att H/W

1

LEAD

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

INDEX


CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY. 

1/12/56
2
1312

56

Enclosure to [REDACTED]

3P
8 May 1956

SUBJECT: Soviet Parliamentary Delegation in Stockholm.

1. As often happens in connection with events of interest in this country, a press conference for the visiting delegation of 10 members of the Supreme Soviet was arranged last night, with only the Swedish press and the large news agencies invited.

2. The press conference was held in Room 418, Grand Hotel, which was so small that news photographers were let in first and reporters afterward.

a. Gustav Liden, a member of the Foreign Ministry press division who had been "lent" to the Swedish parliament leadership as press liaison man for the duration of the visit, explained that the Swedish parliament people had turned a deaf ear to his request for larger quarters for the press conference. "It's full of Rubbestad," Liden said. (Rubbestad is a politically myopic agrarian party politician.)

b. Once inside, the reporters were told by A. P. VOLKOV, the head Russian, that he was sorry there was so little room, "but we are not the hosts here and there was so little time to prepare for this conference." (The visit has only been planned 10 months.)

c. Besides the Swedish press and the news services, there were quite a few others. Felix BELLER of the New York Times, whose office is in the building, had not been invited, but came along anyway. Robert ZUCK, whom I had asked earlier in the afternoon if he had been invited (he had not), came along, and so did the Polish Brazilian Count MICHELINI who works at RFE. Others:

(1) Lennart BRICK, the ex-RTI DAG man now an importer.

(2) Helge (P.) HAVELAND, the Russian embassy interpreter.

(3) Harry WEITMANN and his bride of 6 days, the former Ilse MICHELINI of Germany.

(4) Both Mr and Mrs Gaston FOURMILIER, the husband head of Agence France Presse who does not understand a word of Swedish or Russian.

(5) Ilya MOSKOVTSOV and Dmitri YEREMOV, the TASS boys, who took no notes during the performance.

(6) Some unidentified young females who looked like decorations, or perhaps foils for the plain clothes cops who helped crowd the room to the bursting point.

(7) Yevgeniy VOROTHEYKIN, Soviet press attache in Stockholm.

att #1 to [REDACTED]

3. VOLKOV, as delegation leader, did most of the talking. What he had to say was extensively reported in the papers. His first little ~~spike~~ spiel about the "Soviet parliament not being so perfect that we cannot learn from others" was delivered with eyes half closed and with little nose wrinklings that looked disarming.

4. M. M. KULIKOV, editor of the magazine KOLLEKTIV, a bespectacled man who looked slightly like a gray, finer-featured Hemingway, was visibly nervous when trying to reply to some of the sharper political questions put by the Associated Press man, Gustav SVENSSON. He had to stop and let VOLKOV take over.

5. I. S. GORBUNOV, a round-faced, pink-checked man of 60 who is a member of the law committee of the Supreme Soviet, was asked about the decrees of 1934 (in connection with the assassination of KIROV) and of 1937 (beginning of the purge trials), and at first professed to know nothing about them. When SVENSSON pointed out that Pravda and other Soviet papers had printed pieces about their revision, although in small type, GORBUNOV recalled that those laws were emergency decrees. VOLKOV helped out by adding that the emergencies were over and that these out-of-date laws and others were being revised. "That is not to say that the sentences passed under the emergency laws were wrong at the time. ~~Nevertheless~~ I don't want to generalize and anyway there is no time for that. But it is completely natural that certain laws have been changed. I am sure that in the Swedish parliament the same thing happens. We are not saying that anybody has been unjustly condemned.

6. ~~Which is a good thing to mention~~ An attempt was made to pinpoint VOLKOV on STALIN's foreign policy mistakes by Clas ULLMAN, United Press reporter. VOLKOV did not mention Stalin's name, but said: "I can tell you frankly that we have admitted that our relations with Yugoslavia were not so friendly, and that in this respect it was our fault." He said again that he would have to have more time to go into such answers more fully.

7. On Knut WALLBERG, VOLKOV said the Soviet was waiting for more information from the Swedish government as to where the vanished diplomat might be in the Soviet Union. He appeared to be unconscious of the baroque effect such a statement might have.

8. Ivan KÄBIN, a member of the Central Committee, and the top man in the Estonian Communist party, is a fleshy man in his 40s, with thinning dark blond hair and a worried expression. Although most of the other delegates smiled at least once or twice, he never relaxed his tight-lipped watchfulness.

9. A. M. SAFRONOV, first vice-chairman of the Russian Federated S.R., is said to be a budget expert. He is leader of the Budget Committee of the Supreme Soviet.

10. The main interpreters were Sven N. Starck, veteran employee of the Soviet embassy in Stockholm, and Nina KRYMOVA, a middle-aged woman who made shorthand notes of the Russian replies and efficiently translated them to Swedish.

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

SEP 16 1955

TO : Chief, SR

DATE:

FROM :

INFO:

SUBJECT: GENERAL

SPECIFIC— Personality Data

REF:

1. Herewith transmitted, in two copies each, are the biographical reports requested in the reference on Viola SANDROOS, Richard DAHM, and Rudolf von WETSCHL (concerning Wallenberg). The debriefing was by

2. The attached material allegedly represents the sum total of source's knowledge on this subject. Source's information on SANDROOS and DAHM came entirely from those individuals themselves; source's knowledge of Wallenberg came primarily from von WETSCHL.

Approved:

14 September 1955

Attachments: HERewith, as stated above

Distribution:

4 HQS w/atts in duplicate (DIRECT)
3 w/att - single copy

ENCL 4/5

/ att. #/w

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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1	att.
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3	
4	
5	

16 Sept. 1955

SECRET

JUL 14 1955

TO

DATE

FROM Chief, BR

ATTN: FOR

SUBJECT: GENERAL UNTO PARVILANTI
STRATEGIC Background on Contacts in the USSR

2. The following additional information on the contacts of subject person within the USSR has been obtained from Headquarters' files.

a. Viola SANDROGS, alias KHONE, was born in Detroit, Michigan, 11 January 1918. Nationality, American. Her parents were probably Finnish, possibly Latvian or Estonian. She and her lover, KAMBER, carried out espionage missions in Latvia and Reichenberg (now Liberec, Czechoslovakia) for the Soviet Union. She was arrested by the Germans and transferred to Prague where she was used as a double agent from 1943. She had been assigned to assist Boerner in Austria.

b. L. P. M. Richard Adolf Theodor (aka BHM, Richard Adolf Theodor) was born 27 September 1906 in Germany. He has been a Finnish citizen since 1919. He was a German agent in Helsinki during World War II, but was involved in agent recruiting rather than espionage. He was arrested and released under observation in 1944. He was arrested and turned over to the Soviets by Leino Interior Ministry of Finland in 1945.

2. It is desired that all information PARVILANTI may have on SANDROGS be extracted, especially details such as her status at Dudinka, nature of her contacts with PARVILANTI, her current status in Sortavala, and details of her own account of her past activities.

3.

4. Information is desired on Raoul WALLENBERG as to this person's status, whereabouts, and at what dates information on him was received.

INDEXFORM NO. 51-29
JUL 1949**SECRET**

FROM: SS 2/Fin.				TELEPHONE NO. [REDACTED]	DATE [REDACTED]	
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D			
1. [REDACTED]				[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]						
3. [REDACTED]				[REDACTED]		
4. [REDACTED]						
5. [REDACTED]			13/7	[REDACTED]		
6. [REDACTED]						
7. [REDACTED]				[REDACTED]		
8. [REDACTED]				[REDACTED]		
9. [REDACTED]				[REDACTED]		
10.						
11.						
12. [REDACTED]				[REDACTED]		
[REDACTED]						
[REDACTED]						
[REDACTED]						
[REDACTED]						

JUL 14 1955

RELEASING

**FIELD DISPATCH
PLEASE
EXPEDITE**

14 JUL 55

INDEX

irrelevant material (non Wallenberg)

Von Wetschl, Rudolf, Freiherr

DOB: ca. 1922

Von Wetschl was in Butyrskaya prison in Moscow in the summer of 1945. At that time he was about 22 or 23 years old. He told source that his brother was a Hungarian military attache in London. He said that he had been connected with British Intelligence and with the Gestapo, but claimed that he had actually worked only for British Intelligence. He also stated that he had travelled to Moscow together with the Swedish diplomat Wallenberg, who, like he, had been arrested in Budapest upon the arrival of the Soviet troops. Wallenberg had been the Secretary of the Swedish embassy in Budapest and the representative of the Swedish Red Cross. Source did not meet Wallenberg himself, but he learned from other prisoners that Wallenberg had actually been in Moscow in the spring of 1945, and had first been in Lubyanka prison. In 1955 source was told by a returnee from the Soviet Union that Wallenberg had been in the prison in Vladimir in 1951.

~~SECRET~~

16 Sept 1955

Irrelevant material

CH #1 to [REDACTED]


INDEX

SECRET

CS COPY

10 Sept 1975

Irrelevant material



~~SECRET~~



CONFIDENTIAL

2 August 1956

Info: KE

Search Request

REFERENCE: [REDACTED] 21 June 1956 *Interrogation*

1. This is only a "stab in the dark" but the subject of the reference may possibly be identical with:

[REDACTED] irrelevant

B. SCHNEIDER, Helmut: subject is known to you. (18 Nov 55)

C. SCHNEIDER, Helmut (1st Lt.) Subject is a German officer held in the USSR in Camp 6124 Stalingrad, April 1952. (Information dated 10 Oct 52)

2. Information in our files on Raoul WALLENBERG has been studied without result. >>

3. There is no information in our files on the "BENDIG Group".

[REDACTED]

Approval:

[REDACTED]

Distribution

2 -

2 -

RI COPY

6014

VIA ATR. POLICE
General Atty. Gen. Sec. Pouch

DISPATCH NO. [REDACTED]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 26 November 1956

FROM [REDACTED]

Info: Chief, SR

SUBJECT **GENERAL**
SPECIFIC

Debriefing of Arthur TAMMELIUS

REFERENCE:

[REDACTED] November 1956

HEADQUARTERS ACTION REQUESTED: For information and appropriate action per paragraph 6

1. Reference dispatch has been received and [REDACTED] accepts responsibility for failure to catch this newspaper article when it first appeared, and take appropriate action.

2. There are, however, two points which we feel worthwhile to bring to headquarters attention, and particularly those officers in SR who have occasion to originate dispatches. [REDACTED] The first concerns newspaper coverage in general. There are over five morning dailies plus at least three afternoon papers published in Stockholm.

[REDACTED] Complete and systematic coverage of all newspapers is not considered practicable with the current workload. [REDACTED] NE-DAG, the Communist daily, is the only paper to receive specific attention [REDACTED] and the reason therefor is as a source for [REDACTED] leads. A certain amount of press coverage has been accomplished by [REDACTED] in the past and will be assumed by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in the future; unfortunately these individuals are as apt to overlook an occasional item of importance [REDACTED]

The above is in no way intended as an excuse, but simply as a statement of [REDACTED] policy and procedure which may not be completely understood at headquarters.

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

JCP# 60-74/45-
Box 18

FOLDER 8
RESTRICTED TO WELL

26 November 1956
page two

[REDACTED]

4. We believe that all of the above information has been previously reported, and should be available, yet, the effect of reference dispatch has been to make us wonder if the files are consulted...
5. [REDACTED] was discussed with [REDACTED] on 19 November. [REDACTED] said (as did the newspaper article) that the Foreign Office originally hoped that [REDACTED] could give news of Raoul WALLENBERG. This has not been the case, according to [REDACTED] although he said the Foreign Office is still in touch with the man. [REDACTED] went on to say that he was not sure how important a source subject was since he had only been in the VORKUTA labor camp system the entire 15 years. He added that subject had been a building engineer, had risen quite high in the camp administration system and had traveled around extensively within the Vorkuta area. Because of Foreign Office interest, he recommended that any debriefing be done [REDACTED] rather than by direct contact.
6. If headquarters feels that [REDACTED] has important intelligence potential, we suggest that specific requirements be forwarded to the station for passing to the [REDACTED]. We will raise the subject again with [REDACTED] as the occasion permits in an attempt to identify any positive reports already received which may have already come from this source.
7. We have answered reference dispatch in some detail, although we are fully aware that it is an isolated case, because it has given us the opportunity to report our capabilities, per paragraph 2, and to redefine, per paragraph 3, the differences between the [REDACTED]. And, although a very small point in the overall scheme of things, those field officers who work [REDACTED] (and report thereon) appreciate (perhaps unduly) those dispatches from headquarters which reflect some knowledge of the local scene by originator.

26 November 1956

Distribution:

- 3 - Chief, WE
- 2 - SE Division
- 2 - [REDACTED]

Job # 60-71145-

Box 18

Folder # 4

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~~SECRET~~

MAY 1 1954

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. J. J. T. J. J. J.

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Alleged Plan to Effect Large Purchase of Arms and
Equipment for Group of Customlers Proposed to
Incumbent Customler Day Current

1. Reference is made to [REDACTED] of 10 February 1954 and your
memorandum of 9 March 1954 concerning subject. Copies of reference
correspondence is attached.

2. On 29 April 1954 it was reported that Colonel W. E. THOMAS,
residing at the Mitchell Apartment Hotel, Apartment 1500, 250 West
100th St., New York, New York, is attending to buy aircraft and
equipment from an unknown Swedish firm on behalf of a group of
Customlers. He will receive instructions from his wife in the next
few days to contact an individual named "Eric" or another individual
named SUNDALINBERG. It is believed that SUNDALINBERG may be identical
with either Harry WALLENBERG, a Stockholm arms dealer, or Leo WALLENBERG,
who is mentioned in references.

3. It is requested that your Bureau undertake an immediate
investigation to determine all contacts and activities of Colonel W. E.
THOMAS in relation to his efforts to procure arms for the previously
mentioned group of Customlers.

62-20436 (to be assigned)

For - W.H. [Signature]

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~~SECRET~~
RI COPY

MAY 1 1954

[REDACTED]

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. [REDACTED]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WE

DATE: 18 March 1953

FROM : [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: GENERAL.

○ SPECIFIC: Transmittal of Old Files

The documents listed below, which have been on file at the [REDACTED] are being returned herewith to Headquarters for retention or appropriate disposition:

1. "Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich SCHILLMEIER"
2. "Ménées Terroristes - Organisations ayant pour objet le sabotage des navires," dated 15 Nov 1939

Distribution:
WASH - 3 (w/att)
[REDACTED]

8-9-5

AMC	PI
IS	MSA
ABSTRACT	INDEX

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NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM


1st - "Ménées Terroristes"
EXCLT N-5M

18 MAR 53

~~SECRET~~

5. In view of the past pattern of Soviet attempts to recruit repatriates to Finland, all relations with PARVILAMTI should be conducted as though such a recruitment might have taken place.

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~~SECRET~~

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET

JENŐ LÉVAI

Raoul
Wallenberg

— hjälten
i Budapest



Raoul Wallenberg

- hjälten i Budapest

Av JENŐ LÉVAI

SAXON & LINDSTRÖMS

S&L
